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PROPERTY AS RENT
FAISAL CHAUDHRY†
INTRODUCTION
What is property? Over the course of the past two decades,
legal scholars have reopened this question in a highly visible and
often fractious way. On one side of the renewed debate are those
who have sought to restore an object-centered model of property
as an in rem right to exclude; on the other are those who have
sought to reorient the old adage that property is a “bundle of
sticks” toward a new emphasis on property’s role in forging social
relations and democratic community. Sometimes known as a split
between the “ownership” versus “progressive property” models,1 as
fruitful as the renewed debate between the exponents of these two
views has been, it has been equally paradoxical. This is especially
so today, after the epochal events of the 2007 financial crisis and
the ensuing Great Recession, the most profound since the Great
Depression of the 1930s, which only widened the gap between our
theories of property in law and its actuality in real world financial
practice. Indeed, central to the 2007 crisis was the vast expansion
of mortgage securitization, a practice involving the assemblage of
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Assistant Professor of Law & History, The University of Dayton. I am indebted
to the many who have provided feedback and technical assistance on this Article
including Sarah Zahid, Duncan Kennedy, Joseph Singer, Toni M. Massaro, Ana di
Robilant, Rashmi Dyal-Chand, James C. Smith, Jacqueline C. Hand, David Marcus,
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1
See J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV.
711, 731–33 (1996); Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 743 (2009). Object-centered theorists, especially, have characterized the model they oppose in such terms, usually also distinguishing between
“substantive” or “ad hoc” versus “conceptual” versions of the so-called bundle thesis.
See Penner, supra, at 723–24, 733; Eric R. Claeys, Property 101: Is Property a Thing
or a Bundle?, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 617, 617–18 (2009) (reviewing THOMAS W.
MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (2007)). Of course,
the division that has been articulated between the ownership and progressive
property models in the last two decades can also be linked—as Penner explicitly
does—to earlier (skepticism about) concerns over the disintegraiton of property
famously expressed by Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, 22 NOMOS:
PROPERTY 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
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homeowner debt into complex new forms of financial asset property in which the individual right to exclude is, at best, of clearly
secondary importance.2 Suffice to say, amidst the rise of securitization, it was never the ordinary homeowner who decided whether
to grant access to her property for the purposes of making it part
of the other kinds of debt-based assets being sold to distant
investors on the world’s financial markets.
Now in 2021, though barely a decade removed from the last
time the capitalist world economy was in crisis, a new breakdown
of world-historical proportions has again materialized, having
been touched off by the global Coronavirus pandemic. Yet in a
thoroughly transformed political context that has seen the United
States visited by what many have called the rise of a quasi-fascist
form of right wing ultra-nationalism,3 the likelihood that we will
once again eschew the opportunity to treat the crisis as a basis for
pursuing a deeper structural transformation of the American
economy paints to a more ominous picture than the parallel
decision did after 2007. This is because if on the eve of the mortgage crash, economic life in the United States was already clearly
overbalanced in favor of financial speculators, corporate welfare
recipients, and the rich, the cure put in place after 2007 was, in
key ways, built on intensifying the very tendencies that led to the
catastrophe in the first place. Yet with the Coronavirus pandemic,
especially before the Biden adminstration’s first round of new
relief in early 2021, the initial phase of the bailout under the
March 2020 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act
found the United States once more responding to a crisis of global
capitalism by prioritizing the feeding of ever-larger quantities of

2

THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 42 (2011), https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FCH-NLD9].
3
See, e.g., JOHN BELLAMY FOSTER, TRUMP IN THE WHITE HOUSE: TRAGEDY AND
FARCE 19–20 (2017); Matthew N. Lyons, Foreword to SHANE BURLEY, FASCISM
TODAY: WHAT IT IS AND HOW TO END IT (2017); JASON STANLEY, HOW FASCISM
WORKS: THE POLITICS OF US AND THEM, at xxviii (2018); TRUMPING DEMOCRACY:
FROM REAGAN TO THE ALT-RIGHT 73 (Chip Berlet ed., 2020); FEDERICO
FINCHELSTEIN, FROM FASCISM TO POPULISM IN HISTORY, at xxxi–xxxii (1st paperback
ed. 2019). But see Samuel Moyn, The Trouble with Comparisons, N.Y. REV. BOOKS
(May 19, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2020/05/19/the-trouble-withcomparisons/ [https://perma.cc/CDG5-ZWAR] (striking a somewhat contrary note
based on the fascism analogy’s tendency to “abnormalize” the administration it is
applied to relative to the political history of the United States more generally).
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low- or no-cost money to the wealthy and superrich.4 The reluctance of the unprecedented stock market boom enabled by that
earlier bonanza of free money should thus continue to give us
reason to worry about the possiblity that we have hard-wired into
our political economy an expectation of an endless willingness to
redistribute resources into the hands of the corporate and investor
class for the purposes of amassing speculative financial asset
property of one kind or another.5
Against the backdrop of possible “déjà vu all over again,”
therefore, it would be even more unacceptable than it was after
2007 to allow the gap between property’s lives in legal theory
versus real world financial practice to remain intact. Indeed,
paving the way toward the Coronavirus shock was an aftermath
of the Great Recession that already saw the rise of various new
forms of debt-based assets for investors to take ownership over.
While the most notable of these have been connected to the rise of
exchange traded funds, the reemergence of junk bonds, and other

4

Compare, e.g., Mark Blyth & Eric Lonergan, This Time, Can We Finally Turn a
Financial Crisis into an Opportunity?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar. 20, 2020, 4:41 PM),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/20/this-time-can-we-finally-turn-a-financial-crisis-intoan-opportunity/ [https://perma.cc/VZR9-HAZD], with David Dayen, Unsanitized: Bailouts, a Tradition Unlike Any Other, AM. PROSPECT (Mar. 25, 2020), https://prospect.org/
coronavirus/unsanitized-bailouts-tradition-unlike-any-other/ [https://perma.cc/QY3YDXR7], and Zach Carter, Coronavirus Is a Defining Test and American Government
Is Failing It, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 02, 2020), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/
coronavirus-test-american-government-failing_n_5e7e213fc5b6cb9dc19f199e [https://
perma.cc/582P-5E7H].
5
There is a variety of cost estimates of the bailouts with a shared perspective on
the benefits remaining concentrated among the leading financial institutions. See,
e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF
THE WORLD ECONOMY 108, 134 (2010); Viral V. Acharya, Deniz Anginer & A. Joseph
Warburton, The End of Market Discipline? Investor Expectations of Implicit
Government Guarantees, 2, 3, 33, 35 (May 1, 2016) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1961656 [https://perma.cc/65W2-ZSZV]; Deborah Lucas,
Measuring the Costs of Bailouts, 11 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 85, 105–07 (2019); see also
infra note 158. The account of the former Special Inspector General for the United
States’ Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) presents a more general view of how
the response to the 2007 crisis was deficient in dealing with the proverbial residents
of Main Street. See NEIL BAROFSKY, BAILOUT: HOW WASHINGTON ABANDONED MAIN
STREET WHILE RESCUING WALL STREET, at xv–xx (1st paperback ed. 2013).
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kinds of highly leveraged loan products,6 new forms of real estate
securitization also quietly emerged.7
Drawing on one such new form—involving the securitization
of residential rental payments from single-family homes and their
ultimate transformation into bond holder claims on interest—in this
Article I consider why our existing legal theories have been so illequipped to account for the vast expansion of debt-based financial
asset property, not only after 2007 but really since the 1970s. Given
the related increase in economic inequality over these same
periods, as wealth and income have been steadily redistributed
upward to society’s narrow band of capital owners, it is all the
more curious that legal theory has paid such scant attention to
property’s “financialization.”8 After all, debt-based forms of financial asset property do not just represent straightforward mechanisms for excluding others from what their respective holders deem
6
While they are technically funds bringing together some array of assets (like
stocks, junk bonds, gold, etc.), exchange traded funds (“ETFs”) offer investors indirect
ownership over those assets through shareholding. While in some ways similar to
mutual funds, ETFs allow for share-based financial asset property that can be
continuously bought and sold throughout the course of the trading day, including by
automated mechanisms. ETFs have been on the rise over the last quarter-century,
especially since 2007. See Itzhak Ben-David, Francesco Franzoni & Rabih Moussawi,
Exchange-Traded Funds, 9 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 169, 170, 174–75 (2017).
7
Neil Fligstein & Adam Goldstein, The Transformation of Mortgage Finance and
the Industrial Roots of the Mortgage Meltdown 23–24, 26 (Inst. for Rsch. on Lab. &
Emp., Working Paper No. 133-12, 2012); see also, e.g., U.N. Conference on Trade and
Development, Trade and Development Report 2020: From Global Pandemic to
Proesperity for All: Avoiding Another Lost Decade, at IV–V, UNCTAD/TDR/2020
(discussing the precarious state of the global economy leading into the Coronavirus
crisis); The Age of Disorder—The New Era for Economics, Politics and Our Way of Life,
DEUTSCHE BANK: NEWS (Sept. 9, 2020) [hereinafter The Age of Disorder], https://www
.db.com/newsroom_news/2020/the-age-of-disorder-the-new-era-for-economics-politicsand-our-way-of-life-en-11670.htm [https://perma.cc/X3VE-U3TM].
8
Literature on financialization from disciplines outside of law is vast. See, e.g.,
DOUG HENWOOD, WALL STREET: HOW IT WORKS AND FOR WHOM 66–67 (rev. ed. 1998);
ROBERT BRENNER, THE ECONOMICS OF GLOBAL TURBULENCE: THE ADVANCED
CAPITALIST ECONOMIES FROM LONG BOOM TO LONG DOWNTURN, 1945–2005, at 13
(rev. ed. 2006); GERALD F. DAVIS, MANAGED BY THE MARKETS: HOW FINANCE
RESHAPED AMERICA 1, 5, 26–27 (2009); Justin Fox & Jay W. Lorsch, What Good Are
Shareholders?, HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug. 2012, at 51–52; Robert M. Solow, How to
Save American Finance from Itself, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 8, 2013) (reviewing BEN S.
BERNANKE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2013)),
https://newrepublic.com/article/112679/how-save-american-finance-itself [https://perma.
cc/H3WT-3UKD]; THOMAS I. PALLEY, FINANCIALIZATION: THE ECONOMICS OF
FINANCE CAPITAL DOMINATION 1, 4–5 (2013); Natascha van der Zwan, Making Sense
of Financialization, 12 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 99, 101–03 (2014); L. RANDALL WRAY, WHY
MINSKY MATTERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE WORK OF A MAVERICK ECONOMIST 141
(2016); Bonnie G. Buchanan, The Way We Live Now: Financialization and
Securitization, 39 RES. INT’L BUS. & FIN. 663, 664–65 (2017).
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valuable. Rather, they clearly also comprise claims on the disposal
of society’s productive resources, both in the present and the future.
Accordingly, in this Article I make a normative case against
continuing to stake the fate of our economy on the creation of
exotic varieties of financial asset property, including through evermultiplying forms of securitized real estate debt, for those with
seemingly endless supplies of money capital to take ownership of.
To do so, I work analytically, historically, and empirically to mobilize an alternative conception in law and economics of what I call
property-as-rent. Dating to the very origins of classical economics,
this conception drew on ideas very different from the notions of
consumer preference satisfaction and rent-seeking that have come
to be associated with modern economics ever since the discipline’s
neoclassical revolution after 1870.9 From the vantage point of
property-as-rent, the securitization of real estate debt cannot
simply be justified in terms of promoting liquidity in the financial
markets or democratizing access to mortgage lending. Instead, the
conception of property-as-rent requires asking whether securitized
financial asset property rooted in real estate value is a deleterious
means of redirecting resources from productive to speculative use
by extracting premiums from land’s scarcity.
In pursuing this aim, the Article highlights a new species of
post–Great Recession financial asset property that is known
appropriately enough as the single-family rental-backed security
(“SFRBS”).10 Birthed amidst uncertainty about the potential of its
kind for survival, the first SFRBS became available to investors
only in 2013. As a variation of the mortgage-backed security
(“MBS”), as with securitized assets more generally, the SFRBS
allows yield-seeking institutional investors like pension and hedge
funds to take ownership over bond debt supported by large assemblages of real estate assets. At the same time, the SFRBS varies
9

A blanket term, “neoclassical,” has come to denote the ensemble of ideas that
began emerging in earnest only after the “discovery” of the principle of marginal
utility during the 1860s, which is typically credited to William Stanley Jevons, Léon
Walras, and Carl Menger. See generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 825 (Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter ed., 1954); MARK BLAUG,
ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT 294, 297 (4th ed. 1985); E.K. HUNT & MARK
LAUTZENHEISER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE 249 (3d
ed. 2011).
10
Throughout the Article I use the term rental payments to distinguish the revenue streams paid by ordinary consumers on housing leases that SFRBS securitize
from the economic rent that I argue debt-based financial asset property like the
SFRBS allows its owners to extract from land. While the terms are not unrelated, it
remains important to keep the distinction in mind.
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from the MBS in two key ways. First, most of the assets securitized to date have been single-family homes purchased by private
equity firms, often at fire-sale prices in the wake of the bursting of
the last housing bubble. Second, because these homes are leased
rather than owner-occupied, the interest that is ultimately transferred to institutional investors is intermediated primarily through
the monthly rental payments of their tenant-occupants. I say primarily because the rapid way the market has evolved has meant
that some SFRBS offerings have gone on to include in their securitized asset pools traditional owner-occupied mortgage payments
as well.
Before discussing the Article’s organization, a note of preemptive clarification is necessary, given that real estate-backed
securities, like all forms of debt-based financial asset property, are
made quasi-tangible only through their denomination in money.
Accordingly, it may be tempting for the critical reader to refuse
this Article’s price of admission, perhaps by insisting that legally
protected financial claims belong to the realms of securities law
and contractually secured transactions law more than that of
“property” law. Beyond the question-begging nature of so insisting
and the fact that debate in private law theory has never rigorously
confined itself to a concern only with tangible property, I believe
such an objection is unwarranted. As this Article will show, debtbased financial assets do not float free of any tether. Not only do
such assets ultimately make for claims on what are clearly the
“property” resources underpinning production—and, more indirectly, society’s means of consumption—they also repeatedly take
form as claims on capital redirected into property’s quintessential
variety—namely, real estate.11 Therefore, as with the explosion of
the MBS before, it is no coincidence that the SFRBS is a legal form
linking investment bank and institutional investor control to
value that can ultimately be extracted from the ability of the
quintessential form of property to command a premium due to
land’s nonproducibility. Indeed, as I show, such premiums still
comprise an enormous share of the market value of real estate

11
This point has been widely discussed by historians, geographers, and sociologists. See, e.g., DAVID HARVEY, SPACES OF CAPITAL: TOWARDS A CRITICAL GEOGRAPHY
147–48 (2001); Giovanni Arrighi, Spatial and Other Fixes of Historical Capitalism, 10
J. WORLD-SYS. RSCH. 527, 531 (2004); Neil Crosby & John Henneberry, Financialisation, the Valuation of Investment Property and the Urban Built Environment in
the UK, 53 URB. STUD. 1424, 1427 (2016).
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even today.12 And, of course, it was precisely their capture through
the possibility of legal control over land rather than any cost
associated with its production that led the classical economists to
the now largely forgotten preoccupation with distinguishing unearned rent from other earned incomes in the first place.
***
As for the organization of this Article, it proceeds in four
Parts. Part I delves more deeply into why it is necessary to close
the gap that is further widening between our competing legal
theories of property and the reality of property in real world
financial practice. Here, I canvass the limits of both object-centered views, as well as the countervailing resurgence of a focus on
property’s communitarian dimension to demonstrate why the
neglected conception of property-as-rent serves as such a vital
corrective.
Part II then turns to property-as-rent in earnest. It begins with
a first Section that discusses some key differences between the
classical and neoclassical traditions in economics to flesh out the
notion of consumer preference satisfaction undergirding what is
usually described as the economic conception of property. Doing so
helps to clarify the importance of my own argument that the
control of rent has long undergirded an altogether distinct economic conception of property’s nature. The remainder of Part II
then turns to the genesis of the concept of economic rent—a
cornerstone of classical economic thought going back at least to the
eighteenth century—and the way it informed thinking about landed
property in particular. Here, the Article takes pains to distinguish
this idea of economic rent both from the diluted version that lived
on in neoclassical economics after 1900, as well as the idea of rentseeking that has dominated law and political science since the rise
of public choice theory after the 1960s.
In Part III, I then provide a contextualizing discussion to set
the stage for Part IV by drawing out the importance of the
conception of property-as-rent in our own post-1970s world. Part
III lays out three key aspects of the relevant context: a first
concerning the linked growth of inequality and new forms of debtbased financial asset property, including real estate-backed securities; a second concerning the rise of the Finance, Insurance,
and Real Estate (“FIRE”) sector of the economy; and a third
concerning the phenomenon of financial asset-price inflation.
12

See infra Part IV.A.
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In Part IV, I end by further grounding the Article’s intervention into property theory in the reality of our actual post-1970s
economy. Picking up on elements of Parts I to III, Part IV opens
by drawing on several unique data sets that economist Morris
Davis has made available in order to isolate the share of land or
what we can also call site price values in the composition of home
price values in the residential real estate market at the national,
state, and metro area levels in the United States. Here, I graph
important long-term trends to demonstrate how dependent home
price values are still on scarcity premiums associated with land
and hence how property-in-land rent is transmuted, through
inflated real estate prices, into interest payments to mortgage and
investment bankers and bondholders. This, importantly, is the
case regardless of whether the payment first takes shape through
a tenant’s monthly rental check to some private equity landlord
that has bought up single-family homes with leverage or as a
traditional mortgage payment by an owner-occupier. In the
second Section of Part IV, I then put these trends into dialogue
with the SFRBS as one example of what both the classical and
early American legal economists would just as well have seen as a
proprietary claim in the pure overhead charge of land’s economic
rent. Part IV concludes by providing a several-pronged normative
alternative, both to practical reliance on securitization and to its
traditional justification as rooted in the idea of promoting liquidity
in the financial markets and democratizing access to credit. Doing
so should be particularly timely given the moment of evident
transition we now find ourselves in as we attempt to move away
from an initial round of Coronavirus pandemic relief measures
that concentrated on subsidizing the bailout of Wall Street at the
expense of a much-needed focus on the mass of society who reside
on Main Street. Now more than ever such an exercise in envisioning alternatives is thus necessary if we are to facilitate what
Roberto Unger calls the “democratic experimentalism” and
“institutional innovation” necessary to meet both the ongoing—as
well as the inevitable next—crisis with more effective proposals
for structural change.13

13
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, DEMOCRACY REALIZED: THE PROGRESSIVE
ALTERNATIVE 5, 16 (1998).
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I. WHY RECKON WITH THE GAP BETWEEN PROPERTY IN LEGAL
THEORY VERSUS REAL WORLD FINANCIAL PRACTICE?
While the so-called ownership model of property never fully
went away in the civil law world, in that of the common law world,
the idea that property comprises a direct connection between
persons and things is usually seen as the vestige of an untutored
past. Even so, over the last twenty-plus years the latter intuition
has clearly become untenable. At least since the turn of the millennium, property’s supposed dissolution during the twentieth
century has come under increasing attack. Even before the objectcentered or in rem model started to be reimagined in terms of the
economics of information and the limited forms the common law
has allowed landed estates to take through the so-called numerus
clausus principle,14 the questioning of property’s disintegration
had begun.15 James E. Penner was the first to call for a definitional return to the twin criteria of the right to property’s “thinghood,”
on the one hand, and the “duty of non-interference” it imposed on
the world at large, on the other.16 From this standpoint, the
corresponding right to exclude has once again become the key stick
in property’s bundle—so much so, in fact, that talk of “sticks” and
“bundles” has been made to seem like little more than a pernicious
metaphor.
Yet these several lines of attack did not simply turn the old
common sense upside down. They elicited a corresponding florescence in defense of property’s social or communitarian and
relational dimension.17 Importantly, however, this defense was
not primarily staked on refuting the object-centered model—say,
by denying the potential information efficiencies of the numerus
clauses doctrine. Nor was it based primarily on reemphasizing the
jural relationality of bundle logic.18 Instead, focus shifted to property’s role as a source of “plural . . . values” extending beyond the
14

See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law
of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 13 (2000).
15
See Grey, supra note 1, at 69–85, 70.
16
See Penner, supra note 1, at 713, 802–13; see also JAMES E. PENNER, THE IDEA
OF PROPERTY IN LAW 68–74 (1997) [hereinafter PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN
LAW] (making an even more expansive case). Much literature exists from this early
moment in the resurgence. See J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 157 (1996);
Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right To Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 734–35
(1998).
17
This has most prominently taken place through the idea of “progressive property.” See Alexander et al., supra note 1.
18
Wesley Hohfeld was the key originator of the focus on property as a jural relation. See infra note 25.
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“promot[ion] [of] individual interests” or the “satisf[action] [of]
personal preferences,” like “just social relationships, just [social]
distribution, and democracy.”19 In fact, even before Penner, Gregory
Alexander was picking up on earlier work by Carol Rose20 to strike
a key contrast between property’s reduction to “commodity”21 and
its more fuller role as “propriety.”22
When set off against property-as-commodity in this way,
property-as-propriety served as a ready way of contesting the
resurgence of the object-centered model based on a highly intuitive
anti-economism. Emphasizing propriety thus served as a corrective to the “widely shared misconception” reducing property’s
historical meaning in “American law” to “market alienability.”23
Ultimately, this resurgence of debate has been more than just
polarizing. Aside from its inherent fruitfulness, it also has generated new efforts at finding a middle ground. In a recent pair of
articles, for example, Anna di Robilant uses a legal historian’s eye
to bring the so-called ownership model into chronologically deeper
dialogue with the view from property’s relationality. In the first,
she highlights a third-way “tree”24 model of property that Italian
legal thinkers were developing at the very same time that Wesley
N. Hohfeld is said to have inaugurated property’s great unbundling in the United States in the 1910s.25 In the second, she
highlights a half-century of new legal forms for controlling real
estate such as the community land trust and common interest

19

Alexander, et al., supra note 1 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Property as Wealth, Property as Propriety, in 33 NOMOS:
COMPENSATORY JUSTICE 223 (John W. Chapman ed., 1991).
21
GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF
PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776–1970, at 1 (1997). Other compatible
work is abundant. See, e.g., JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY: FREEDOM,
COMMUNITY, AND THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 2 (2010).
22
ALEXANDER, supra note 21.
23
See id.
24
Anna di Robilant, Property: A Bundle of Sticks or a Tree?, 66 VAND. L. REV. 869,
871–72 (2013).
25
Given his premature death, Hohfeld’s insights were confined to two main
articles. In the first, he decomposed ostensibly unitary rights—like that to property—
into a series of “jural correlatives” comprising the four pairs of privilege: no-rights,
right-duties, powers-liabilities, and immunities-disabilities. See Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE
L.J. 16, 30 (1913). In the second, he argued for doing away with the distinction
between in rem and in personam when characterizing the elemental jural entitlements belonging to the actors on either side of those correlatives. See Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE
L.J. 710, 712–16 (1917).
20
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community that seem to fly in the face of the ostensible strictures
of the numerus clausus doctrine.26
In calling attention to the neglected conception of property-asrent, this Article also works in part historically. It does so, however, through pushing in a new direction more than toward a
middle ground between existing extremes, each of which can be
limiting. With their focus on refuting bundle thinking as a common missense, for example, object-centered perspectives have
carried the risk of striking down a straw man, even while offering
a contrary view too highly abstracted to offer much purchase on
the world of the real political economy and the still-proliferating
forms that property has clearly taken therein.27 Indeed, in pursuit
of reclaiming property as an in rem right, object-centered theory
has often become bogged down in hair-splitting and difficult-tomaintain distinctions—for example, between the right “to use,” “to
exclude,” and “to exclusively determine use”—or in circularly
invoking the numerus clausus principle as a way out.28 On the
other hand, even as they have eschewed a full-throated defense of
the Hohfeldian view from jural relationality, progressive property
perspectives have tended to draw on the notion of propriety to
question the reduction of property to its strictly economic conception, only to then end up paradoxically reinforcing that very
conception. That is, much of the force of the propriety versus
commodity distinction depends on assuming that there has been
only a single way of conceptualizing property economically and
even that economic conceptualization itself means offering an
account based on the paradigm of neoclassical economics.29
26
See generally Anna di Robilant, Property and Democratic Deliberation: The
Numerus Clausus Principle and Democratic Experimentation in Property Law, 62 AM.
J. COMPAR. L. 367 (2014).
27
Consider the fleeting way such theories have handled proprietorship over
money and, especially, monetarily denominated debt. See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra
note 14, at 50 (on security interests); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The
Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 833–43 (2001) [hereinafter
Merrill & Smith, The Property/Contract Interface] (same). Penner touches on money
but says little about more complex forms of debt. See, e.g., PENNER, THE IDEA OF
PROPERTY IN LAW, supra note 16, at 164–66.
28
See Merrill & Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, supra note 27, at 792–
96; Penner, supra note 1, at 819 (conceding that our baseline verbal conventions may
have, already long ago, outstripped any seeming impropriety of envisioning such legal
entitlements to the exchange value of commodities and assets as “property”).
29
See generally supra note 9. Utility perspectives did, of course, previously exist,
even being strongly associated with well-known figures like Nassau William Senior.
The idea of marginal utility, however, allowed the unworkable tabulation of total
utility to be set aside and for exchange value to be conceived of as proportionate, not
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Accordingly, in its next Part, this Article looks back to a long
pre-Coasian tradition of law and economics to draw out a competing view of the right to property as a means of appropriating
economic rent—understood more specifically as a stream of unearned income—from scarce or monopolized resources. Alongside
property-as-commodity and property-as-propriety, this third conception of property-as-rent or property-in-rent traces the work of
the classical economists. Importantly, it also remained crucial for
early institutionalist or legal economists and their legal realist
inheritors in the United States, even as it was ever further
obscured within economics in the wake of the discipline’s neoclassical or marginalist revolution after 1870.30

to the labor embodied in a commodity, but to the subjective pleasure derived from the
last or marginal increment of the commodity that was still worth the consumer’s while
to consume, relative to other possible consumption choices. See, e.g., TAKASHI
NEGISHI, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THEORY 319–20 (1989).
30
See BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT
HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 127 (1998); Herbert
Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics Movement, 42 STAN. L. REV. 993,
1013–14 (1990) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics
Movement]; HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL
LEGAL THOUGHT, 1870–1970, at 108 (2015) [hereinafter HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING
OF AMERICAN LAW]. Some words about terminology are in order. First, it is worth
noting that Hovenkamp re-labels “neoclassical legal thought” to encompass what
Fried, following most, calls “Progressive Era” legal thought as well as legal realism.
Fried’s usage is more like Alexander’s, which charts a movement from Progressive
Era legal scholars like Commons to Realists by the 1930s. See generally ALEXANDER,
supra note 21, at 311–51. Hovenkamp’s titular usage does have some benefits. For
example, “neoclassical legal thought” captures what is usually identified as having
come before the late Progressive Era in the United States: namely, a period of
“classical legal thought” after roughly 1860. At the same time, it also evokes the
parallel emergence of neoclassical or marginalist economics. Here, however,
Hovenkamp’s usage can also become confusing, given that, as he grants, among the
legal thinkers he focuses on during his post-classical “neoclassical” era of legal thought
are individuals who as economists were heterodox “institutionalist” economists
outside of the mainstream of neoclassical economics. Second, therefore, I use the term
“institutionalist economists” or “early legal economists” to refer to figures like
Thorstein Veblen, John R. Commons, Richard T. Ely, and Edwin Seligman in the way
Hovenkamp generally does outside of his book’s title, because it is more revealing than
simply calling them “Progressive Era” legal scholars. Third, while I thus differentiate
such figures from the legal realists, I concur with Hovenkamp that controversies
around Realism should not obscure the obvious. That is, the Realists were, in essence,
the lawyer-inheritors of institutionalist economics and championed its lessons
through a time in the 1930s when the economics profession had thoroughly turned
against its legacy and toward neoclassical orthodoxy in ways reproducing some
tendencies of Hovenkamp while also, elsewhere, chafing against them—but focusing
on classical economists in the United States alone. See Duncan Kennedy, The Role of
Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of Commodities, 34 AM. U. L. REV.
939, 967 (1985).
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In calling attention to this now neglected conception based on
the idea of extracting rent in classical economics,31 I offer a
different way to think, in theory, about property’s nature. At the
same time, as the Article will go on to show, the perspective from
property-as-rent also offers a better way to make sense of our
contemporary reality, which for the last four decades has seen
financial ownership claims on society’s productive resources
proliferate alongside a concurrent redistribution of wealth and
income upwards. Since the mid-1970s, there has thus taken place
a vast reordering of claims—claims that by their very nature
extend long into the future—on society’s productive resources via
legal forms that are ambiguous between providing for control over
earned income versus unearned rent. Indeed, as scholars from
various disciplines have dubbed it, amidst the great eras of the
economy’s “financialization”32—through both the finance sector
proper and the related sectors devoted to insurance and real
estate—most notable has been the even more specific growth of
debt-based financial asset claims on society’s productive
resources.33
31

To clarify, I am not suggesting that the significance of institutionalist economics—much less, legal realism—has gone unnoticed. However, attention to their
significance is different from attention to the role of rent in effectively underpinning
an alternative conception of property going back to the work of the leading classical
economists, and even all the way back to the seventeenth century. By linking early
institutionalist economics to an idea of property-as-rent, this Article departs from
existing scholarship in the history of legal thought in the United States. The overall
portrait presented here, therefore, is more indebted to work in the history of economic
thought such as by Walter Eltis, E.K. Hunt, Mark Lautzenheiser, and Michael
Hudson. See WALTER ELTIS, THE CLASSICAL THEORY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH, at xliii–
xlv (2d ed. 2000); HUNT & LAUTZENHEISER, supra note 9, at 501; and MICHAEL
HUDSON, KILLING THE HOST: HOW FINANCIAL PARASITES AND DEBT BONDAGE
DESTROY THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 43–64 (2015). Finally, to diagram the ways that some
of the themes of this Article cross paths with, or more genuinely intersect, recent
writings by legal scholars, two last points are in order here. First, in emphasizing the
very different way rent was conceived in classical versus neoclassical economics, I
present a decidedly different point of view from that which can be gleaned in Radical
Markets. See ERIC A. POSNER & E. GLEN WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS: UPROOTING
CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY FOR A JUST SOCIETY 42 (2018). This is notwithstanding
any overlap in spirit in the policy prescriptions I offer in Part IV of this Article. At the
same time, much of what I argue about the notion of property-as-rent could well
benefit, if space permitted, from being put into further dialogue with recent work on
law and political economy. See, e.g., KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL: HOW
THE LAW CREATES WEALTH AND INEQUALITY 40 (2019); MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE
VALUE OF EVERYTHING: MAKING AND TAKING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 5 (2018).
32
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
33
The literature overlaps with that on financialization. See, e.g., JULIET B.
SCHOR, THE OVERSPENT AMERICAN: WHY WE WANT WHAT WE DON’T NEED 19 (1999);
DAVID GRAEBER, DEBT: THE FIRST 5,000 YEARS 18 (2011); LOUIS HYMAN, BORROW:
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Surely, then, focusing on the rise of debt-based financial asset
property-in-rent tells a story different from that through which the
link between the increasing liquidity of capital and property’s dephysicalization has usually been told. That story has typically
centered on the baseline events surrounding the validation of
“property in value” through so-called laissez-faire constitutionalism in and around the time of the Gilded Age and amidst the rise
of dispersed ownership with the advent of shareholder equity in
the modern corporation.34 Of course, in the United States, it is no
coincidence that the early institutionalist economists and their
legal realist inheritors pioneered the investigation of these
themes. Highlighting the move to “exchange value” and “incorporeal property” was thus among John R. Commons’ central preoccupations, just as it was Adolphe Berle and Gardiner Means who
most visibly raised concerns about the implications of separating
corporate ownership from control.35
On one level, then, focusing on property’s conception in terms
of the extraction of economic rent helps us to make sense of the
growth of real estate-backed securities in specific and financial
asset forms in general during the new “Gilded Age” of the
present.36 In this respect, it turns our attention to an era after the
mid-1970s that was necessarily beyond the horizon of the first

THE AMERICAN WAY OF DEBT 14 (2012); ATIF MIAN & AMIR SUFI, HOUSE OF DEBT:
HOW THEY (AND YOU) CAUSED THE GREAT RECESSION, AND HOW WE CAN PREVENT IT
FROM HAPPENING AGAIN 112–13 (2015).
34
See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 145–46, 159, 166–67 (1994); JAMES W.
ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS 89–90 (3d ed. 2008); ALEXANDER, supra note 21 at 248–76
(contesting the label though not necessarily reaching conclusions so very different);
David N. Mayer, The Myth of “Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism”: Liberty of Contract
During the Lochner Era, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 217, 218 (2009).
35
JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 11–19 (1924); Murray
L. Weidenbaum & Mark Jensen, Introduction to ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C.
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY, at ix, ix (Transaction
Publishers 1991).
36
The phrase has become a staple in media commentary and scholarship since
inequality started coming back into visible focus after 2011. See, e.g., Nathan
Schneider, The New Guilded Age, NEW YORKER (Oct. 12, 2015), https://www
.newyorker.com/business/currency/the-new-guilded-age [https://perma.cc/S9B9-R942];
Paul Krugman, Why We’re in a New Gilded Age, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (May 8, 2014),
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/05/08/thomas-piketty-new-gilded-age/ [https://
perma.cc/X5ER-PGR5] (reviewing THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Belknap Press 2014) (2013)). Rigorous
scholarly discussion of inequality, however, has been afoot, even if given little
attention, from much earlier. See infra note 119.
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generation of legal economists and their early legal realist inheritors as well as the legal historians who have remained interested
in their work. On another level, focusing on property’s conception
in terms of rent also serves as a corrective to the way indifference,
antagonism, and time have invariably lessened the impact of the
work of the early pioneers. For example, consider Berle and
Means whose attention to the separation of corporate ownership
and control as a potential source of inefficiency was largely forgotten already in their own day, with neoclassical economists largely
inverting the lesson to be drawn from their work.37 Indeed, as
neoclassicism continued its ascent after the 1930s, the main
symbolic valence that came to surround the phenomenon of
dispersed corporate equity was that of the vaunted “democratization” of shareholding. Moreover, this was despite the uncontroversial facts about how highly concentrated the holding of stock assets
has always been, being confined to no more than a tiny sliver of
the population, especially on any significant scale.38
A final reason why reckoning with debt-based financial
property-in-rent is warranted is because of how surprisingly little
attention legal scholars have paid to it, whether before or after the
bursting of the housing bubble. This has been all the more
noticeable given that, even despite the role of mortgage-backed
securities in instigating the Great Recession and its aftermath,
financial engineering has hardly ceased in continuing to create
new legal mechanisms for capturing economic rent, including from
land.39
37

HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 30, at 172–76.
See HENWOOD, supra note 8, at 56–114 (treating this issue extensively); see also
PIKETTY, supra note 36, at 15, 24 (figuring this issue into many of the trends that are
empirically documented). Another excellent source of current figures is William
Domhoff’s “Who Rules America” series. See G. William Domhoff, Wealth, Income, and
Power, WHO RULES AMERICA?, http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/
wealth.html [https://perma.cc/4UN7-HRPV]; see also Benjamin Landy, A Tale of Two
Recoveries: Wealth Inequality After the Great Recession, CENTURY FOUND. (Aug. 28,
2013), https://tcf.org/content/commentary/a-tale-of-two-recoveries-wealth-inequalityafter-the-great-recession/ [https://perma.cc/XN8L-9LGZ].
39
Indeed, warnings of a return to pre-crisis levels of risk were well underway only
a half-decade after 2007. See J. David Cummins & Mary A. Weiss, Systemic Risk and
the U.S. Insurance Sector, 81 J. RISK & INS. 489, 489–90 (2014); Christopher L. Culp
& J. Paul Forrester, Have Pre-Crisis Levels of Risk Returned in U.S. Structured
Products?, 21 J. STRUCTURED FIN. 10, 10 (2015); Natasha Sarin & Lawrence H.
Summers, Have Big Banks Gotten Safer? 1 (Sept. 15–16, 2016) (unpublished working
paper) (on file with Brookings Papers on Economic Activity); JACK RASMUS, SYSTEMIC
FRAGILITY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 35–38 (2016); Asset Prices: The Bubble Without
Any Fizz, ECONOMIST: BRIEFING (Oct. 7, 2017), https://www.economist.com/briefing/
38
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II. ANOTHER LAW AND ECONOMICS: PROPERTY-AS-RENT
In Part II, this Article now turns its attention more fully to
the conception of property-as-rent that I argue was formative to
economics before the neoclassical revolution, and that continued
to influence early institutionalist or legal economists in the United
States like Thorstein Veblen and John R. Commons.40 By pointing
to the potential wealth-siphoning and -destroying effects of
property, this alternative conception was distinct not only from the
extra-economic idea of property-as-propriety but also from the idea
of property-as-commodity, especially as it has been inflected by the
paradigm of neoclassical economics.
Before disinterring the conception of property-as-rent, two
preliminary caveats are necessary. First, Part II makes no attempt at exhaustively summarizing how concern with the appropriation of land rent intersected with thinking about property
in classical economics as a whole—that must be left to a different
article. Second, nor does Part II advert to capture any singular
essence of classical economics as if to suggest that it was a more
uniform body of thought than it actually was, or that it shared
nothing with economics after the neoclassical revolution.
Obviously, the notion of an auto-adjusting market—a notion on
which neoclassical consumer theory, as well as post-Coasian law
and economics, has relied—did not emerge out of thin air. Rather,
like its neoclassical counterpart, classical economics was also
generally premised on the idea of market-clearing equilibrium.41
Yet even if more gradual than suddenly revolutionary, the advent
of neoclassicism clearly did involve some kind of profound break

2017/10/07/the-bubble-without-any-fizz [https://perma.cc/ES3F-E6ZH]; Jim Reid et
al., Long-Term Asset Return Study: The Next Financial Crisis, 2017 DEUTSCHE BANK
MKTS. RSCH. 35–36. For a less ominous, although not necessarily inconsistent, point
of view on euphoria and consternation in the financial markets in the wake of the
COVID-19 shock see Robert J. Shiller, Making Sense of Elevated Stock Market Prices,
N.Y. TIMES (March 5, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/05/business/stockmarket-prices-bubble.html [https://perma.cc/HF89-K7LY].
40
See supra text accompanying note 30. It is Veblen who coined the term “neoclassical,” although it became ubiquitous only after mid-century. While Veblen is remembered as a sociologist, he is better thought of as a heterodox economist fiercely critical
of the emerging neoclassical consensus.
41
That is, market clearing through free rather than perfect competition. See infra
text accompanying note 50. Of course, among the classical economists were indeed
figures like Jean-Baptiste Say who raised the idea of supply equaling its own demand
to a veritable scientific law that still bears his name today. See JEAN-BAPTISTE SAY,
A TREATISE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY OR THE PRODUCTION, DISTRIBUTION, AND
CONSUMPTION OF WEALTH 219–20 (Augustus M. Kelley 1971) (1803).
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from the previous century-plus of “modern” economic theorizing in
the Western world, which—notwithstanding predominant tropes
about Adam Smith—generally worked from a very different
paradigm.42
A.

Different Properties: Classical Versus Neoclassical Economics

By way of further unpacking the last observation, Section II.A
considers four more specific features that generally distinguish
classical from neoclassical economic thinking: a first, having to do
with the distinction classical thinkers made between natural
price—and/or value—and market price; a second having to do with
how neoclassical, or consumer, theory effectively erased the line
between production and exchange; a third having to do with the
distinct idea of profit that emerged after the neoclassical revolution; and a fourth having to do with the distinction between profit
and rent.
1.

Natural Versus Market Price

While it is common to assume that the defining question of
economics is about maximizing behavior in the face of supposedly
infinite wants, this focus on constrained optimization is better
understood as the most basic transformation wrought by the socalled neoclassical revolution.43 For most classical economists,
before and after Adam Smith, the great question of the discipline
had more to do with the growth of aggregate output, relative
prices, and their effect on the distribution of class shares of income
across society than it did with the metaphor of the invisible hand.44
In response to this question, the principal answer was not one that
pointed to the law of supply and demand, which, at any rate, the
most prominent classical economists saw as only a modulating
force. Rather, the answer pointed to the costs necessary to bring
land, labor, and capital into production, which, as determined
42

See, e.g., Sankar Muthu, Adam Smith’s Critique of International Trading
Companies: Theorizing “Globalization” in the Age of Enlightenment, 36 POL. THEORY
185, 193–94 (2008) (discussing the “two” sides of Adam Smith).
43
Only then, moreover, was the discipline’s guiding question made amenable to
mathematical representation as a problem of constrained optimization subject to the
techniques of differential calculus—in no small part by way of emulating a very
nineteenth-century idea of science, especially physics. See PHILIP MIROWSKI, MORE
HEAT THAN LIGHT: ECONOMICS AS SOCIAL PHYSICS, PHYSICS AS NATURE’S ECONOMICS
194–97 (1989); see also infra text accompanying note 47.
44
ALESSANDRO RONCAGLIA, THE WEALTH OF IDEAS: A HISTORY OF ECONOMIC
THOUGHT 324–25 (2009).
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prior to and outside of the process of market exchange, were seen
as the driving forces behind pricing.45
Accordingly, a staple feature of classical economism was to
distinguish between “market price” and “natural price” and/or
“value”—especially for those like the greatest of the tradition’s
exponents, the British economist David Ricardo.46 Doing so went
hand in hand with the overarching concern just noted with working out a cost of production account of commodity values rather
than any theory based on the then still unquantifiable notion of
hedonistic preference.47 Indeed, among the leading classical economists, the logic of commodity was never simply synonymous with
preference satisfaction through market purchase—whether, as for

45

See generally ELTIS, supra note 31; RONCAGLIA, supra note 44; HUNT &
LAUTZENHEISER, supra note 9; see HUDSON, supra note 31, at 53. Most of these issues
would not reemerge until after 1950 with the so-called Keynesian synthesis and the
emergence of neoclassical growth theory and development economics.
46
DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION
(1817), reprinted in 1 THE WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID RICARDO 1, 91–92
(Piero Sraffa ed., 2004).
47
Of course, by the beginning of the nineteenth century the utilitarian thinker
Jeremy Bentham had coined the idea of tabulating utility through a so-called felicific
calculus. However, these unsystematic musings notwithstanding, absent a basic idea
of marginal utility Bentham’s utilitarianism—let alone the non-utility-based thought
of Smith, or, say, John Locke—could not sustain any theory of value as subjective
preference. So long as “pushpin [was] as good as poetry” when the “quantity of
pleasure” was equal, as Bentham’s utilitarianism famously had to allow, not only was
“interpersonal comparison[ ]” of utilities impossible, but so too was quantification.
HUNT & LAUTZENHEISER, supra note 9, at 163; HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 30, at 112. Marginalism allowed for quantification through
effectively introducing an ordinal rather than cardinal numbering scheme. However,
especially for more redistribution-oriented economists during marginalism’s early
years, there were strong temptations to operate as if what had happened was the
reverse. That is, the temptation was to imagine that the fruits of marginalism’s
quantifying mathematization of the discipline were actually ordinal so that relevant
interpersonal comparisons of utilities could, in effect, be drawn. The issue, however,
would come to a head, making for the dividing line between the old versus the new
neoclassical welfare economics, roughly after the First World War. Indeed, a major
achievement of Vilfredo Pareto as a welfare economist was to help do away with what
many had come to feel was the embarrassment of earlier neoclassical welfare theory’s
belief in cardinal quantification through the notional idea that utility could be
evaluated in terms of units of absolute measure known as “utils.” Cambridge economist Nicholas Kaldor pushed Pareto’s project even further after the late 1930s. As the
years leading up to the Great Depression wore on, moreover, the political valence
attached to the aspiration toward cardinal quantification and interpersonal comparison had also shifted, at least within the neoclassical mainstream. This was due to a
growing antagonism to the progressive strand that had emerged within earlier
marginalist argumentation favoring income redistribution. See HOVENKAMP, THE
OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 30, at 110–14 (covering some of these
observations with different emphasis).
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the neoclassicals, of consumer goods by households from firms or
of productive factors by firms from households; nor, to any greater
degree, was the logic underlying the conception of property that
went with classical economism.
Of course, the last statement does not mean that classical
economism had no apologetic streak, including with respect to the
property that individuals had or acquired in their commodities
through their role in the class-based hierarchy of income distribution.48 It is, however, to say that whereas for the leading classical
economists income distribution was the key determinant of the
prices of commodities, the direction of causation was generally
reversed in neoclassical thought, especially after its own theory of
income distribution was perfected.49 From the very start, therefore, the way was more open in classical economics to see within
the right to property not just a basis for increasing economic wellbeing,50 but also its stifling, insofar as property could also be
identified with rent—as, indeed, it increasingly came to be,
especially as a claim on land.51
2.

Production Versus Exchange

To the extent that recent debate has sought to contest the
object-centered view of property by switching focus to the view
from propriety—that is, the view from property’s independent role
in forging social and communitarian relations—it has both
equated economic explanation with neoclassicism and suggested
that property’s commodity character is exhausted by the theory of
48

See Kennedy, supra note 30, at 943, 955–57. Given Kennedy’s focus on the form
of classical legal thought that built on classical as well as early neoclassical economics
in the fifty years after 1860–1870, his work suggests that the legal extrapolation of
classical economics had a more pronounced apologetic streak than the economic
tradition itself did.
49
For neoclassical theorists, prices thus generally determined income distribution. As for what determined prices in their picture, this was one of the ways that
supply and demand—itself now ultimately grounded in utility—was assigned a much
broader role in neoclassical theory. For the leading classical economists, in contrast,
supply and demand only helped determine “market price,” which as noted was distinct
from “natural price.” HUNT & LAUTZENHEISER, supra note 9, at xx, 258. In theory,
income distribution was thus independent from prices, being the determinant of,
rather than determined by, natural price. See id.
50
For the classical economists, increasing well-being corresponded to an increase
not in “welfare” but “wealth,” both by labor’s foundational input into commodity production and, in turn, the gains brought from exchanging them under “free”—though,
importantly, not “perfect”—competition. See Kennedy, supra note 30, at 942–43, 945;
see generally ELTIS, supra note 31.
51
See infra Section II.C.
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the neoclassical consumer.52 Indeed, this feature of resurgent
debate has proved especially notable given that it was only as late
as Hohfeld’s own time when the latter theory came to cover more
than just consumers in the ordinary sense. That is, it was still
another several decades after 1870, the rough origin point of
economics’ revolution, and only with the development of neoclassical income distribution theory—as the American economist John
Bates Clark expanded on the canonical work of the famed British
marginalist Alfred Marshall—that marginalism was able to create
a perfect symmetry between firms and households.53 On the
perfected view, assuming competitive equilibrium, households
were said to maximize utility by making calculations at the margin about how much of the factors of production they owned to sell
to firms—in exchange, ultimately, for consumption goods.54 The
firm, on the other hand, was said to make exactly analogous
decisions, albeit here about the supposedly continuous marginal
substitutability of the productive factors it purchased from households to maximize profits by receiving the moneys ultimately paid
out for consumer goods.55
In contrast, among the leading exponents of the thought
tradition of classical economics, property’s importance was not
reducible to its role as a source of utility arising from consumption
choices made at the margin. Especially for the present purposes,
more to the point are the competing roles it was assigned—on the
52
Tellingly, on Alexander’s account it would seem that, without proper attention
to property’s independent sociopolitical or communitarian aspect, “disaggregative” or
bundle thinking can reveal little more than object-centered views do, especially those
that presume an unbroken continuity from Hohfeld to Coase. See ALEXANDER, supra
note 21, at 381–82.
53
See JOHN BATES CLARK, THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH: A THEORY OF WAGES,
INTEREST AND PROFITS 200 (Cosimo Classics 2005) (1899). The impression is often
given that classical income distribution theory went into abeyance. However, that
view is unfounded, having become untenable at least since the work of the famed
Italian neo-Ricardian economist, Piero Sraffa, and the so-called Cambridge capital
controversy it helped inspire. See PIERO SRAFFA, PRODUCTION OF COMMODITIES BY
MEANS OF COMMODITIES: PRELUDE TO A CRITIQUE OF ECONOMIC THEORY 13–14
(1960); see also BLAUG, supra note 9, at 137–43 (presenting dueling views of Sraffa);
HUNT & LAUTZENHEISER, supra note 9, at 434–57 (same).
54
HUNT & LAUTZENHEISER, supra note 9, at 305–07.
55
One can add that each factor the firm purchases is further portrayed as
procured for the value of the marginal product it contributes to an output that is then,
in turn, seen as being sold at cost. In this way, what the factor contributes to the
output is exactly returned to the factor owner as payment in the same way that the
payment the factor owner receives exactly corresponds to what is needed to procure
the output. See generally id. at 286–308 (noting that the resultant picture is one in
which “profit disappears in equilibrium”).
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one hand, as a prerequisite for production and hence for bringing
value into being and, on the other, as a means of garnishing
revenue generated out of production and hence for siphoning
value. The murky line between these roles a matter of continuous
preoccupation. After all, it was not by accident that the most
prominent texts of the classical tradition were focused on the principles of political economy underlying the production and taxation
of an economic surplus over and above ordinary subsistence.
Overall, then, the once analytically firm line that classical
thinkers drew between production and exchange was steadily
eroded amidst the protracted set of intellectual developments that
made for the so-called neoclassical revolution as an actual historical process.56 These unfolded gradually after 1870 and extended
at least into the 1920s, when Vilfredo Pareto refined Léon Walras’s
ideas57 into a new form of neoclassical “welfare” economics based
on the “indifference curves” developed by his contemporary, the
Englishman Francis Edgeworth.58
Even without saying more, it should thus be clear that
preference satisfaction exhausts property’s economic conception
only to the extent that all economic activity is, itself, reconceived
as a form of consumption choice on the market; this, however, only
became the case more recently than is generally understood when
reflexively equating economic thought in general with the
neoclassical tradition in particular.59
Importantly, these first two distinguishing features of classical economism were not unrelated to one another. That is, in
classical economics, the market price of a commodity represented
only a modification around natural price’s tether because natural
price was more fundamentally tied to the cost needed to produce
output or a commodity; that cost, itself, was seen as determined by
the distribution of income among land, labor, and capital, conceived, in effect, as distinct social classes rather than just inert
56

See HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 30, at 113.
Id. at 207; SCHUMPETER, supra note 9, at 827.
58
See Lansana Keita, Welfare Economics and Positive Neoclassical Economics, 33
J. VALUE INQUIRY 335, 339–46 (1999) (discussing the relationship between early
welfare theory and neoclassicism). Here I am referring only to the Walrasian welfare
economics of Pareto. An additional strain of neoclassical welfare theory can be traced
to those who put a greater emphasis on Menger’s version of marginalism. That
tradition links both to the so-called Austrian School of economics associated with
Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek already before 1950 and Milton’s Friedman’s
Chicago School in the United States after 1950. See, e.g., HUNT & LAUTZENHEISER,
supra note 9, at 374–75; NEGISHI, supra note 29, at 279–315, 330–43.
59
See generally ELTIS, supra note 31.
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factors of production that could be owned by anyone.60 Even
looking no further than Adam Smith, as he notes repeatedly:
The whole annual produce of the land and labour of every
country, or, what comes to the same thing, the whole price of that
annual produce, naturally divides itself . . . into three parts; the
rent of land, the wages of labour, and the profits of stock; and
constitutes a revenue to three different orders of people; to those
who live by rent, to those who live by wages, and to those who
live by profit. These are the three great, original, and constituent, orders of every civilized society, from whose revenue that of
every other order is ultimately derived.61

As is possible to infer from no more than the above passage,
immanent in this way of seeing things was a question about the
extent to which the return going to each social class was truly
earned—in the sense of being a payment necessary to bring what
belonged to its respective members into production.62 That with
reference to those who owned land—something that was unproduced—the answer to this question should be in the negative
became more apparent to leading thinkers in the classical
tradition after Smith, especially his greatest inheritor, Ricardo.
3.

Classical Versus Neoclassical Profit

The last observation leads us to a third key difference between
the classical and neoclassical traditions of economic thinking that
is worth highlighting. This is because, for neoclassicals, productive factors were no longer simply understood as threefold—
through the division between land, labor, and capital—nor did
they analytically correspond to different social groups. Rather,
they were more various and more fungible things that could just
as well be the property of any individual in society. Whoever was
a factor’s owner, therefore, her household was free to sell that
factor—based on the appropriate maximizing calculation at the
60
Even the eighteenth-century French Physiocrats, who were a crucial influence
on Smith, did not classify the spending of manufacturers as “sterile”—in their own
threefold division between manufacturers, consumers, and landlords—only or mainly
to venerate the spending of landlords as the opposite. Rather, by doing so they laid a
policy basis for a “[s]ingle [t]ax” on the returns or rents of landed property in France.
See HUDSON, supra note 31, at 48–49. In terms of policy focus, then, there was an even
straighter line from the Physiocrats to the Ricardian Socialists in Britain and figures
like Henry George—and even more so, the early institutionalist economists—in the
United States than there was from Ricardo himself. See infra notes 71–73.
61
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 161 (Harriman House 2007) (1776).
62
See sources cited supra note 45.
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margin—to firms, considered as the commanders of the now altogether additional factor of entrepreneurship. In turn, the profit
that firms maximized under equilibrium was no more than a basic
remuneration for the entrepreneurial labor or disutility—the line
between these, too, now gone—of coordinating the creation of
output from all the various factors the entrepreneur assembled
together.63 Indeed, as the neoclassical tradition matured, by 1930
interest more than profit had become the key category of revenue
attributed to capital owners, with their entrepreneurial profit
proper becoming merely a subcomponent of interest.64
On the one hand, then, this modified idea of profit in neoclassical consumer theory comprises a third important difference from
the classical view. On the other, it further explains how the first
two differences—rooted in the distinctions that classical economists drew between market price and natural price and between
production and exchange—were made to all but disappear in
neoclassical theory. That is, on the view formative to neoclassicism, profit maximization in equilibrium did not prevent output
from being sold at cost.65 To the contrary, like the factor of entrepreneurship, so too did every other factor—whoever happened to
be its owner—get paid a purchase price conceived as exactly
matching the value of the marginal product it contributed to
output.66 Here, one can further see how the direction of causality
that the leading classical economists saw as holding between
income distribution and prices—from the former to the latter—
was generally reversed in neoclassical theory.67
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See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 53.
For Chicago school economists like Frank Knight—one of Milton Friedman’s
mentors—profit thus represented the risk premium above the basic interest rate that
could be earned on risk-free bonds. See MICHAEL HUDSON, THE BUBBLE AND BEYOND:
FICTITIOUS CAPITAL, DEBT DEFLATION AND THE GLOBAL CRISIS 147–48 (2012).
Knight’s idea built on a more basic distinction between risk and uncertainty. See
FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 19–20 (1921); see also infra note
83 and accompanying text.
65
CLARK, supra note 53, at 115.
66
Clark’s description of his own purpose is instructive:
[T]o show that the distribution of the income of society is controlled by a
natural law, and that this law . . . would give to every agent of production
the amount of wealth which that agent creates. . . . So far as it is not
obstructed, it assigns to every one what he has specifically produced.
Id. at v.
67
See supra note 49.
64

386

4.

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:363

Profit Versus Rent

Together, the three differences recapitulated above imply a
fourth as well. Even more directly connected to the additional
conception of property that is the focus of Section II.B, this difference involved the much greater—and even overriding—attention
that classical thinkers gave to distinguishing profit from unearned
economic rent. Indeed, in Ricardo’s economics not only was the
contrast paramount, but it also made rent a—and even the—
defining feature of the quintessential form of property held by
Britain’s landed gentry.68 Of course, like those he influenced—
including John Stuart Mill—Ricardo did not fail to see that
revenues garnished by landowners could, in principle, include both
profit and economic rent.69 However, the important point was that
the potential ambiguity between the two required vigilance.70
B. The Identification of Rent with Land in Classical Economics
For Ricardo, rent ultimately constituted a differential in the
productive capacity of superior lands compared to those at the
margin of cultivation; or, as he famously put it, rent was nothing
other than “the produce obtained” from the same or different
pieces of land “by the employment of two equal quantities of
capital and labour” on it or them.71 In this respect, Ricardo assumed an identity between rent and land, specifically landed
property, in a way that was not uncommon for the classical
economists.72 A half-century after his death in 1823, however, in
the wake of the neoclassical revolution, this assumption would
come in for two very different types of qualification.
On the one hand, by the start of the twentieth century, there
was a first qualification that broadly complemented a line of
thought that initially began to emerge closer to Ricardo’s own day
in Britain; in the 1830s and 1840s, that line of thought pushed
Ricardo’s73 own thinking in the direction of advocating for a policy
68

See RICARDO, supra note 46, at 87.
See id. at 49–50.
70
See ELTIS, supra note 31, at xlv–xlvi.
71
RICARDO, supra note 46, at 57.
72
Notwithstanding his disagreements about rent’s implications and laudability,
Ricardo’s contemporary, the Reverend Thomas Malthus, shared this basic definition.
See T.R. MALTHUS, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND PROGRESS OF RENT, AND THE
PRINCIPLES BY WHICH IT IS REGULATED 1–2 (1815).
73
While it is clear that Ricardo’s ideas influenced figures like Mill and certain of
the so-called Ricardian socialists after his death, controversies remain about the
extent to which Ricardo really directly influenced the latter group. See, e.g., J.E. King,
69
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of taxing away the economic rent of landlords as an “unearned
increment.”74 John Stuart Mill, who coined the latter phrase, was
the most prominent example,75 and his mid-century extrapolation
of Ricardo remained highly visible even at century’s end in places
like the United States, especially through its influence on the
journalist Henry George and his “single tax” on land movement.76
Given George’s personal and political idiosyncrasy, however, as
economist Michael Hudson notes, in the Progressive Era it was the
early institutionalist or legal economists who most clearly picked
up on and extended Ricardo’s way of linking rent to landed
property, in particular.77
While I will return to the institutionalists in Section II.C, for
now it is enough to say that whereas they tended to expand the
Ricardian concern with rent beyond land and thereby to sharpen
its bite, neoclassical theory tended to do the opposite. The second
major qualification that Ricardo’s thought came in for, thus,
involved questioning rather than extending his focus on land as
rent’s exclusive source. In pressing this point, neoclassical theory
dispersed and dulled the force of classical rent theory. What early
neoclassical thinkers found lacking in Ricardo’s concern with the
consequences of moving toward marginal land was his alleged
Utopian or Scientific? A Reconsideration of the Ricardian Socialists, 15 HIST. POL.
ECON. 345, 345 (1983).
74
JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH SOME OF THEIR
APPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 817–18 (W.J. Ashley ed., 1909) (1848). Ricardo
himself never advocated any such policy. While an antagonist of the landed gentry, he
was even more of a partisan of British manufacturers and financiers. His key policy
aim was vindicated only after his death in the late 1840s when the grain import
restrictions known as the Corn Laws were lifted. On Ricardo’s theory the Corn Laws
meant domestic grain could only be procured through resort to increasingly marginal
lands with a higher cost of production. In turn, increasing revenue was absorbed as a
pure overhead of rent to landlords, which then cut into the profits of manufacture and,
ultimately, economic growth. See RICARDO, supra note 46, at 373–78.
75
MILL, supra note 74, at 818–19. As a transitional figure in the history of economics, Mill offered ideas about taxation that were, in his own day, seen as premised
on equalizing “sacrifice.” See, e.g., Edwin R.A. Seligman, Progressive Taxation in
Theory and Practice, 9 AM. ECON. ASS’N Q. 563, 795 (1909).
76
See HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE CAUSE OF
INDUSTRIAL DEPRESSIONS, AND OF INCREASE OF WANT WITH INCREASE OF WEALTH
389 (1879); see generally EDWARD T. O’DONNELL, HENRY GEORGE AND THE CRISIS OF
INEQUALITY: PROGRESS AND POVERTY IN THE GILDED AGE (1st paperback ed. 2017)
(presenting a contemporary study of George).
77
See Michael Hudson, Henry George’s Political Critics, 67 AM. J. ECON. & SOCIO.
1, 4–5 (2008) [hereinafter Hudson, Political Critics]; see also Michael Hudson, Veblen’s
Institutionalist Elaboration of Rent Theory 7 (Levy Econ. Inst., Working Paper No.
729, 2012) [hereinafter Hudson, Rent Theory], http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/
wp_729.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7CS-LMC5].
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failure to see that it was only one instance of a larger principle of
diminishing returns.78 That principle, they argued, was none
other than the one the neoclassical revolutionaries had finally
brought to light so as to put economics on a truly scientific
foundation.79 To say that it was the marginal increment rather
than total quantity of utility that mattered was thus to point to
the diminishing returns of satiety resulting from consumption. As
mentioned earlier, it was only on this understanding of utility that
a new theory of calculable or quantifiable economic value-asmarket price could eventually be erected.80
Whereas Ricardo’s focus was on the higher cost of production
at the margin of cultivation, his neoclassical qualifiers suggested
that he should have really used the principle of diminishing returns to ground an understanding of all economic activity in
consumptive exchange. As John Bates Clark put it best,
[w]e have already gone far enough to get a view of one very
general law. So all-embracing, indeed, is it that it dominates
economic life. Classical studies afforded a glimpse of the working
of it, within a very limited field, by their study of the so-called
diminishing returns from agriculture. . . .
Modern studies of value afford a glimpse of the action of this
principle in a wholly different sphere. They show that doses of
consumers’ goods, given in a series to the same persons, have less
and less utility per dose. The final utility theory of value rests on
the same principle as does the theory of diminishing returns from
agriculture; and this principle has a far wider range of new
applications. One law, therefore, governs economic life, and
theories old and new contain partial expressions of it. . . . As this
law may be traced in consumption, where the “final increment”
of a particular article is less useful than earlier increments, so it
is observable also in production, where the final increment of an
industrial agent is less fruitful than earlier ones. As value depends on final utility, so shares in distribution depend on final
productivity.81

As for rent, on this view, it was not only abstracted away from
land but away from the very idea that legalized control over land
could serve as a constraint on production that allowed economic
value to be siphoned off as the revenue of those granted entitle78

See CLARK, supra note 53, at 191–92.
See, e.g., MIROWSKI, supra note 43, at 217–18; MARY S. MORGAN, THE WORLD
IN THE MODEL: HOW ECONOMISTS WORK AND THINK 91–92 (2012).
80
See supra note 47.
81
CLARK, supra note 53, at 208.
79
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ment to such legal constraint. In the process, the basis for linking
land, rent, and the right to property was also dissolved. Read only
as an insight concerning diminishing returns, Ricardo’s idea of
landlord rent no longer illustrated how the right to property could
impose overhead charges on future income from production.
Rather, it now merely illustrated that all incomes were “differential gain[s]” in the same way as was land rent.82 In a passage
indicating how the classical economists’ concept of a “surplus” was
restricted even as the role of interest was expanded in neoclassical
theory, Clark’s thoughts are again instructive:
Ground rent we shall study as the earnings of one kind of
capital-goods—as merely a part of interest. We . . . see that
wages and interest, though they are determined by the law of
final productivity, are also capable of being measured exactly as
ground rent has been measured. That is to say, the Ricardian
formula, which describes what is earned by a piece of land, may
be used to describe what is earned by the whole fund of social
capital: all interest may be made to take the form of a differential
gain, or a surplus.83

It should thus not be surprising that the most visible face of
the idea of rent in law, economics, and political science today has
become that which traces back to the term’s rechristening through
Gordon Tullock and Anne Krueger’s notion of “rent-seeking” after
1960.84 In its latter version however, the concept has borne only a
superficial resemblance to the idea of property-as-rent in classical
economics, not to mention the attempted extension of the conception of property-as-rent by the early institutionalists to non-landed
forms of entitlement as well. Further corroborating the point is
how in public choice theory Tullock and Krueger’s idea of rentseeking has principally been used to evoke an image of public
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Id. at 191.
Id. (footnote omitted) (“It is one of the most striking of economic facts that the
income of all labor, on the one hand, and that of all capital, on the other, should be
thus entirely akin to ground rent. They are the two generic rents, if by that term we
mean differential products; and the earnings of land constitute a fraction of one of
them.”); see also Conway L. Lackman, The Modern Development of Classical Rent
Theory, 36 AM. J. ECON. & SOCIO. 51, 53 (1977).
84
See Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W.
ECON. J. 224 (1967); Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking
Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291 (1974); see also Ronald Bird & Vincent J. Tarascio,
Paretian Rent Theory Versus Pareto’s Rent Theory: A Clarification and Correction, in
2 VILFREDO PARETO: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS OF LEADING ECONOMISTS, VOLUME 2,
473, 474 (John Cunningham Wood & Michael McLure eds., 1999) (discussing the
(misnomer of) “ ‘Paretian’ rent[s]” in later neoclassical economic theory).
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corruption born from the ability of political actors to use the state
for their own enrichment. Implying virtually the opposite of what
the conception of property-as-rent did, the contemporary notion of
rent-seeking thus largely abandons focus on the market’s in-built
capacity to pervert economic well-being through the standing
possibility for property entitlements to function as means of
monopoly-like constraint. In place of any conception of propertyas-rent, public choice theory’s view from rent seeking instead
tends to insist on the absolute primacy of the market—and, hence,
the right to property—as the only true means of guaranteeing
private well-being. On this view, rather than being an endemic
feature of the market given its institutional basis in property, the
seeking of rent becomes extrinsic to true economizing behavior.85
C. From the Origins of Property-as-Rent to Early Legal
Economism and the Present
While Ricardo’s neoclassical qualifiers suggested that identifying rent specifically with landed property was a symptom of
shortsightedness, historically speaking, the matter was not so
simple. The identity, in fact, hardly originated with Ricardo or
even classical economics. Rather, it began to emerge more than a
century before the publication of Smith’s The Wealth of Nations in
1776, as first property and then rent started to be abstracted as
concepts within legal and economic discourse.86 If, as Bentham
famously put it, “[p]roperty” was “born together” with “law,” equally
can we then say that the concept we now know under its name—
that was grounded in control over land as its quintessential form—
entered into the world only in tandem with rent.87
As historian Clive Holmes explains, it was thus really in the
first two decades of the seventeenth century that the “notion of the
right of property” started to be “transmuted” from a “narrow
85

See Biplab Dasgupta, The New Political Economy: A Critical Analysis, 32 ECON.
& POL. WKLY. PE13, PE13–PE14 (1997) (providing an insightful overview of the “new
political economy” forged out of the idea of rent-seeking and public choice theory); see
generally NANCY MACLEAN, DEMOCRACY IN CHAINS: THE DEEP HISTORY OF THE
RADICAL RIGHT’S STEALTH PLAN FOR AMERICA (2017) (discussing Nobel Laureate
James McGill Buchanan’s role in casting government as the principal source of “rents”
and the public, in general, as those doing the seeking).
86
See Clive Holmes, Parliament, Liberty, Taxation, and Property, in PARLIAMENT
AND LIBERTY FROM THE REIGN OF ELIZABETH TO THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR 122, 138
(J.H. Hexter ed., 1992).
87
JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL CODE (n.d.), reprinted in THEORY
OF LEGISLATION 88, 113 (R. Hildreth trans., Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co.
1908); see also supra note 74.
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concept [within] the technical vocabulary of late medieval lawyers”
into “an abstract right.”88 Especially pivotal in this process of
“transmut[ation]” was the way that common law claims to land, in
particular, were taken up into the right to property’s incipient
abstraction.89 With rent, on the other hand, it took another few
decades before its meaning began to rise out of the connotative web
of ordinary English language. Only then had the basis developed
for the concept to diverge from its origins in thirteenth-century
French financial usage where it specified a certain class of annuities known as rente—as per an earlier technical meaning that
obviously had already made its way into common law parlance
well before the sixteenth century, as when stipulating the
purchase price of land at so many years of rent.90
As the political theorist David McNally shows, the key vehicle
for advancing rent’s conceptual abstraction into a technical notion
of economic rent was the proto-economic writing of Thomas Mun,
an early director of the East India Company. In 1628’s English
Treasure by Foreign Trade, Mun developed a connection between
the balance of trade—the oft-mentioned centerpiece of “mercantilist” unsophistication—and the increasing price of farm commodities.91 His central point was that the net “influx of specie”—with
which mercantilist thinkers are often said to have been naively
preoccupied—was important not as an end in itself but for its effect
on increasing the total quantity of what Mun dubbed rent,
specifically agricultural rent.92
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Holmes, supra note 86.
See id. The details of the sequence Holmes describes cannot be recounted here
in full. Overall, however, Holmes’ concern, which is with the “complex,” “intriguing”
and ultimately historical “process” by which “a right to private property” was “insulated”—through its abstraction—“from arbitrary royal intervention.” Id. Certainly, he
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As the historian Niall Ferguson explains, rente annuities arose from the problem city-states faced in financing deficits without Church censure in the thirteenth
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73–74 (2008).
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More than Mun, however, it was his more famous inheritor,
William Petty, who fastened the still newly abstracted concept of
rent to the only slightly less new conceptual abstraction of the
right to property, including in land. In 1662’s Treatise of Taxes
and Contributions, Petty effectively launched the proposition that
the defining feature of land under the right to property was its
ability to yield rent. Although in Petty’s usage rent here was a
stand-in for the soil’s surplus output, once costs of production were
subtracted,93 the nominally same identity was maintained by
those who would go on to coin and then refine the famed “[t]rinity
[f]ormula”94 of classical economics as it passed from the French
Physiocrats, to Adam Smith to Ricardo.95 While the ongoing modification of the formula eventually saw its first two elements—of
the profits of stock and the wages of labor—further differentiated,
the third element of the rent of land held constant as a metonymic
stand-in for the special return appropriated by the owners of land.
Even exiting our brief historical excursus here, two points
become clear. First, in further contrast to the neoclassical reception of Ricardo, there is good reason to see the focus on land as a
source of rent that long predated him as being of central rather
than incidental importance. Central, that is, because the focus on
land as the source of rent implicitly buttressed an economic
conception of the right to property that was distinct from any
reduction of it, instead, to a means of preference satisfaction;96 and
more than incidental because the long-standing identity between
landed property and rent which Ricardo observed was not
important simply, or even mainly, because it illustrated the larger
principle of diminishing returns at work.

93
See WILLIAM PETTY, A TREATISE OF TAXES AND CONTRIBUTIONS (1662),
reprinted in 1 THE ECONOMIC WRITINGS OF SIR WILLIAM PETTY 1, 43 (Charles Henry
Hull ed., Augustus M. Kelly 1963), quoted in MCNALLY, supra note 91, at 50.
94
See 3 KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 953–56, 958,
961, 965 (David Fernbach trans., Penguin Books 1991) (1894).
95
See HUDSON, supra note 31, at 60–64.
96
It is also worth noting that property-as-rent was distinct from an economic
conception focused on wealth generation through inducing individuals to labor or
invest, as the view from neoclassical consumer theory might be restated if one wanted
to insist on locating its origins before 1870—whether through Bentham or Smith’s
work or even John Locke’s so-called labor theory of property. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose,
Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 330 (1996). As to
whether Bentham’s utilitarianism—let alone the non-utility-based thought of Smith
or Locke—can really be seen as a version of neoclassical consumer theory in germ
form, as noted earlier, there are ample reasons for doubt. See supra text accompanying
note 47.
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Second, the above excursus into the deeper history of identity
between rent and the entitlement to land requires that we rethink
the widely held idea that property started to be de-physicalized
only upon being uncoupled from land and linked, instead, to intangible “exchange-value” as industrialization matured.97 Especially in a United States that was long rendered land-rich98—
through a process of dispossessing Native Americans that was,
itself, still ongoing during the period of breakneck industrial
expansion99—property’s de-physicalization is often said to have
begun only in the age of laissez faire constitutionalism. Indeed,
this point often goes hand in hand with the further lament that
because the right to property’s economic conception is exhausted
by the notion of preference-satisfying individualism, its distinct
social and communitarian aspect gets short shrift.100
As Part II has sought to clarify, however, the standard story
about the rise of “property in value” is incomplete and even
misleading. Already long before the first industrial revolution—
let alone the second101—there was a thoroughly de-physicalized
vision of property that inhered in the idea that entitlement to land
mattered precisely because it allowed its holder to appropriate a
uniquely unearned stream of payment.102 In this respect, rather
than a misapprehension or case of tunnel vision, focusing on land
as rent’s source added a further—and, in ways, the very first—
basis on which property became a “keystone right,” to borrow a
phrase from Carol Rose.103
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See COMMONS, supra note 35, at 18–19; Weidenbaum & Jensen, supra note 35.
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Indeed, the conception of property-as-rent did not simply go
into abeyance after neoclassical thinkers charged Ricardo with
failing to appreciate that he had really just discovered one
instance of a larger principle of diminishing returns that could be
applied much more generally to economics. As I touched on earlier
in Section II.B, the legal or institutionalist economists of the
Progressive Era in the United States were also keepers of the idea
of property-as-rent, a feature of their enterprise that has been far
too little appreciated.104 In their case, however, by trying to push
beyond rent’s strict identification with landed property alone they
were pushing in a very different direction from their early
neoclassical counterparts. Likewise, the limitation in Ricardo’s
thought that they sought to overcome was not about his alleged
failure to see the true scope of the principle of diminishing returns.
To the contrary, it was about overcoming his failure to treat money
and debt as anything more than a neutral force that could be
presumed to “affect[ ] commodity prices, wages, and other incomes
symmetrically.”105 Still the dominant view today on such an
understanding is that money always goes to payment for goods
and services and never, say, to bidding up the value of real estate
and financial assets or to eliciting an ever-expanding array of new
debt-based property forms. That money could also be a political
institution, a form of social power, a withdrawn hoard, and so on,
was simply out of the question for Ricardo; and so too did it then
remain in Alfred Marshall’s canonical textbook of the early
neoclassical tradition; as so too it still largely remains in the
present.106
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See sources cited supra note 31; Hudson, Rent Theory, supra note 77, at 7;
Hudson, Political Critics, supra note 77, at 2–5.
105
Dirk Bezemer & Michael Hudson, Finance Is Not the Economy: Reviving the
Conceptual Distinction, 50 J. ECON. ISSUES 745, 748 (2016).
106
See 1 ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 79 (1890). At least in the
English-speaking world, Marshall’s text remained the standard until Paul
Samuelson’s in the second half of the twentieth century. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON,
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1947). While picked up from Ricardo, the idea
of money’s “neutrality” or its role as a mere “veil” also traced back before him to earlier
versions of the quantity theory of money that was its underpinning. See Don Patinkin
& Otto Steiger, Note, In Search of the “Veil of Money” and the “Neutrality of Money”:
A Note on the Origin of Terms, 91 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 131, 138, 141 (1989) (setting
forth the history of the “veil”or “neutrality” label, which Marshall did not himself use
directly but which was used to describe him and his followers in the 1930s by the later
British economist, John Hicks). Most prominently, there was David Hume’s version
of the latter from the 1750s. Id. at 131. In its modern incarnation in orthodox
monetary economics, the quantity theory of money asserts a direct proportionality
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Beyond his theory of comparative advantage, Ricardo’s adherence to money’s neutrality was the other key legacy of his
thought that survived the neoclassical revolution. Just as it did
for Ricardo himself, the view of money’s neutrality would go on to
enable his neoclassical inheritors in further excluding the possibility that interest-bearing bank credit, in its then still limited
array of legal forms, might too be a means of taking proprietorship
over unearned rent.107 In fact, as noted earlier, neoclassical
thinkers generally sought to demonstrate the opposite, instead
transforming interest into the ordinary return of capital owners
with profit, itself, being transformed into just one subspecies of
interest.108 Not surprisingly, for their own part, the early legal or
institutionalist economists tended to challenge this way of embracing the seeming regression in Ricardo’s thought as compared to
Adam Smith’s where the question of interest was concerned,
although their objections quickly receded from within attention of
most neoclassical thinkers.109 Within the conversation that did
remain audible to those in the neoclassical milieu, it would be John
Maynard Keynes who would most clearly articulate some
noticeable version of the same objection.110
Through their altogether different way of pushing past the
Ricardian inheritance, it was thus the institutionalists who made
the idea of property-as-rent more acute. In so doing, they eschewed simply remapping the concept onto a generalized notion of
differential gain in the way neoclassical thinkers were intent on
doing, to the ultimate effect of making labor and capital incomes,
themselves, no more than “generic rents” as John Bates Clark put
it.111 While here is not the place to go into further detail about
Clark’s line of thought, understanding the competing ways in
between the general price level of goods and services and the amount of money in
circulation. Id.
107
See Bezemer & Hudson, supra note 105, at 748.
108
See HUDSON, supra note 64, at 38–39.
109
See id. at 39 (discussing Smith’s much less sanguine view of interest-bearing
debt and its continuity with a much longer previous history of the same).
110
Picking up on his earlier work, in his best-known book Keynes described
interest as a “rentier” return, and rentiers, themselves, as “functionless investor[s]”
akin to the Ricardian landlord. See, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY
OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY (1936), reprinted in 7 THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 1, 376 (4th ed. 2013) (“Interest to-day rewards no
genuine sacrifice, any more than does the rent of land. The owner of capital can obtain
interest because capital is scarce, just as the owner of land can obtain rent because
land is scarce.”). See HUDSON, supra note 64, at 150–53 (considering how Keynes
diminished his own earlier ideas in The General Theory).
111
CLARK, supra note 53, at 191; see also supra note 83 (containing the full quote).
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which the neoclassical and institutional economists handled
Ricardo’s legacy does make it easier to understand various aspects
of institutionalist thought. Doing so, for example, clarifies the
concerns that the greatest of the American institutionalists,
Thorstein Veblen, was trying to address in 1923’s Absentee Ownership. Likewise, it puts the lesser known but well-respected Edwin
Seligman’s abandonment of “sacrifice theory” as a basis for
progressive taxation into new perspective, while also helping to
explain why he instead endorsed what he called “the point of view
of production” as the most realistic perspective from which to
properly account for the “advantage[s]” that “possess[ors]” of
producing “facult[ies]” were able to leverage toward the end of so
effortlessly increasing their respective “possessions.”112 Much the
same goes for the famed John R. Commons’ thesis that the key
shift that the United States’ economy had undergone involved a
transition from an age of “exclusive holding for self” to one
premised on a power of creating scarcities by “withholding from
others.”113 Finally, understanding the early American legal or
institutional economists as individuals attempting to extend
Ricardo’s view of rent beyond land as its exclusive source also
makes more intelligible even the more slogan-like pronouncements of the famed realist Judge Jerome Frank—equating
property with monopoly, for example.114
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EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY, THEORY,
PRACTICE OF INCOME TAXATION AT HOME AND ABROAD 32 (2d ed. 1914);
Seligman, supra note 75, at 289, 291. Seligman’s abandonment of the “sacrifice theory”
had to do with what Hovenkamp describes as the larger antagonism to progressive
marginalism’s key premise by the 1930s. See Hovenkamp, The First Great Law &
Economics Movement, supra note 30, at 1033–37. By then, neoclassical welfare theory
was arguing the strictly “positivist” position that determinate judgments could not be
drawn about whether a wealthy person valued her marginal dollar less than a poor
person. Id. at 1039, 1041–45. The “positivist” view thus said that interpersonal
comparisons about even marginal satieties were impossible because they could only
be known “ordinal[ly].” Id. at 1035. See also supra note 47.
113
COMMONS, supra note 35, at 53 (first emphasis added); John R. Commons, Law
and Economics, 34 YALE L.J. 371, 380 (1925) (“Now it is the engineer, the technologist,
the labor manager, the laborer, who increases the efficiency values by enlarging
output, but it is the business man, or rather the business function of all men, which
maintains or increases the scarcity values by withholding output. The technologist is
a specialist in efficiency, the business man a specialist in scarcity.”).
114
Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 38–39 (2d. Cir. 1945) (Frank,
J., concurring), quoted in HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note
30, at 199; see generally ROBERT JEROME GLENNON, THE ICONOCLAST AS REFORMER:
JEROME FRANK’S IMPACT ON AMERICAN LAW (1985) (discussing Frank’s broader
intellectual formation).
AND
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With all this said, however, it would still be a mistake to
imagine that the importance of recovering the conception of
property-as-rent—which land, in all its irreducible tangibility,
underpinned—is to be found mainly on theoretical or historical
grounds. To the contrary, by clarifying the continuity between
“the first [great] law [and] economics movement” in the United
States as pioneered by institutionalists like Veblen and Commons115 and the concerns that started to be articulated well over
two centuries before in the work of proto-economic thinkers like
Mun and that continued to be perfected during the nineteenth
century by thinkers like Ricardo, we also stand to gain better
purchase on our own era. With its ever-proliferating forms of
entitlement over debt-based financial assets, this is especially the
case given how little our resurgent debate pitting the objectcentered and progressive models of property against one another
has been able to illuminate the present era. As for why it should
be a priority for property scholars to try to gain better purchase on
the present, on one level it is because debt-based financial asset
claims are, in one way or another, ownership claims on future
incomes from production. On another level, it is because of the
even more striking fact that even today such claims remain, in no
small part, ultimately staked on revenues derived from land’s
scarcity value.
Of course, here land must not simply be understood as coequal
with real estate, a term that in the predominant market and
accounting practice conflates the cost of built structures with the
undifferentiated site prices of land proper. Ironically, then, to
better understand our contemporary world by reaching around
property’s competing conceptions as commodity versus propriety
and instead reaching toward its neglected conception as rent, we
need not even be so rigorous as to pick up from where the legal and
institutional economists of the Progressive Era left off. Instead,
given how dependent our economy continues to be on scarcity
premiums derived from land, we only really need to pick up from
where the classical economist predecessors of the institutionalists
left off. In other words, relaxing the identity between rent and
landed property is, in a sense, beside the point when it comes to
reckoning with the proliferation of debt-based financial asset
claims on real estate value in the new “Gilded Age” of the present.

115

at 993.

See Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics Movement, supra note 30,
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As I will eventually show in Part IV of this Article, this is
borne out by the fact surrounding the great acceleration of housing
price increases in the United States economy since the mid-1970s,
which has seen the value of land increasing far more rapidly than
that of built structures. As a result, land’s site price drives an
ever-increasing share of housing price values in the real estate
market. Inclusive of the varying scarcity of public goods that arise
through differential government investment in the vicinities surrounding housing sites and exclusive of the value of new housing
structures on sites that arise through private real estate
entrepreneurialism, even today in the twenty-first century, the
land’s price remains a wellspring for the extraction of economic
rent. Surely, then, it is no accident that financial forms devoted
to taking proprietorship over land rent also continue to multiply.
III. CONTEXTUALIZING THE RISE OF FINANCIAL ASSET PROPERTY
I will return to the question of the land’s rising site value and
the new form of securitized property-in-rent it has permitted in
the wake of the mortgage crisis–cum–Great Recession and what
can be thought of as a long-gestating sequel, the ongoing economic
turmoil touched off by the Coronavirus shock. Before doing so,
however, Part III bridges Parts I, II, and IV by first discussing the
larger context for understanding the more general rise of debtbased financial asset property in the United States since the
1970s. Part III emphasizes three elements of the last forty to fifty
years of context in particular: (1) the growth of inequality in
wealth and income; (2) the rise of debt, real estate securitization,
and the FIRE sector; and (3) the phenomenon of financial assetprice inflation.
A.

Reckoning with the Growth of Inequality

Already well before the rise of right-wing ultranationalism
and the renewed economic crisis touched off by the Coronavirus
pandemic, in the wake of the bursting of the last housing bubble
and the ensuing Great Recession, it had grown thoroughly untenable to keep ignoring the way inequality116—in both income
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Unless otherwise stated, this Section focuses on inequality within the United
States, not inequality within the globe’s other nations, global inequality between
nations, or inequality across the globe’s entire population taken as individuals—the
latter two are particularly affected by the outsized importance of goings-on in India
and China. See generally BRANKO MILANOVIC, GLOBAL INEQUALITY: A NEW AP-
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and, more importantly, wealth—had become a major economic
problem and even a social emergency in the United States.117 Of
course, on both fronts the problem has been severely magnified
across racial lines.118 Moreover, as is equally clear, it is also no
longer plausible—if it ever was—to continue trying to explain
away the growth of inequality as a function of “a rising tide lifting
all boats,” despite the lingering ubiquity of such a sentiment. Even
putting aside how income and wealth polarization is deleterious in
itself, the rising tide metaphor is misplaced. While its logic might
capture a dynamic that was still at play when John F. Kennedy
popularized the phrase in the 1960s, it simply fails to capture
present trends. At the risk of stretching the metaphor, more
accurate would be to say that there have been rising yachts and a
vast majority of lesser vessels left either rudderless or sinking, not
to mention the large number of former passengers who have been
thrown overboard.119

PROACH FOR THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (2016) (presenting an overview of trends in
these different types of inequality).
117
See Edward N. Wolff, The Asset Price Meltdown, Rising Leverage, and the
Wealth of the Middle Class, 47 J. ECON. ISSUES 333, 336–37, 340–41 (2013) (discussing
how inequality in income and wealth has fared after the Great Recession); see also
Landy, supra note 38 (comparing wealth inequality trends before 2007).
118
DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED: RACE, WEALTH, AND
SOCIAL POLICY IN AMERICA 5 (10th anniversary ed., 2010); Carlos Gradin, Race and
Income Distribution: Evidence from the USA, Brazil and South Africa, 18 REV. DEV.
ECON. 73, 75 (2014); THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, TOXIC INEQUALITY: HOW AMERICA’S
WEALTH GAP DESTROYS MOBILITY, DEEPENS THE RACIAL DIVIDE, AND THREATENS
OUR FUTURE 14–17 (2017).
119
It is obviously not possible to recount comprehensively how debate on domestic
inequality has evolved. In brief, however, especially through the 1990s, when these
questions were much less visible, versions of the “rising tide lifts all boats” argument
were vigorously advanced as ostensible correctives to those calling for greater
recognition of inequality as a problem. In effect, the corrective asserted that the real
issue was not inequality but poverty. See, e.g., Martin Feldstein, Income Inequality
and Poverty 1–4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 6770, 1998),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w6770.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZS4K-F6AX]. Such claims
were often further accompanied by the idea that more concerted efforts to combat
inequality through the tax and transfer system would sap economic growth and
actually submerge the lower boats that were often simultaneously suggested to be
rising. See, e.g., Robert E. Lucas Jr., The Industrial Revolution: Past and Future,
REGION, May 2004, at 4, 7, 20. Claims about the growth-inhibiting effect of
redistribution thus gave rise to a further layer of debate. Likewise, the same happened
with the equally recurrent claims questioning wage inequality’s importance by
suggesting that it was simply due to a skills gap favoring workers with information
technology competence, as per so-called skill-biased technological change theories.
Skipping over the details, by the present time, research has more and more forcefully
reinstated and expanded on the original reason there seemed to be for alarm—rooted,
as it was, in issues of class power, the bipartisan drift to tax policy favoring the
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Even so, discussion of inequality has too easily been able to
remain opaque, not only with respect to the question of periodization but also causation. Of these two aspects, the first is the easier
to clarify, notwithstanding the persistence of the idea—especially
in partisan discussion—that intensified inequality is a phenomenon of the first decade of the new millennium, whether in the leadup to the Great Recession during the Bush years or after 2008
during the Obama years. In reality, the growing polarization of
income and wealth in the United States—and, indeed, much of the
world—has witnessed a sharpening separation of the top ten and,
in reality, the top one and even top one-tenth of one percent of the
population from those below since the mid-1970s.120
Furthermore, it must be noted that even though the ascent of
inequality was given little spotlight before 2011, a clear effort to
document the problem was already under way fifteen to twenty
years earlier. Indeed, a disturbing picture had already emerged
not only prior to the so-called sub-prime crisis of 2007, but even
before the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2001. Its quantitative
dimension was filled in by select economists, sociologists, and

wealthy, and so on. See Lawrence Mishel, Heidi Shierholz & John Schmitt, Don’t
Blame the Robots: Assessing the Job Polarization Explanation of Growing Wage
Inequality 4, 7, 35–36 (Nov. 19, 2013) (unpublished working paper), https://files.epi.
org/2013/technology-inequality-dont-blame-the-robots.pdf [https://perma.cc/CJE4-2SBB]
(considering the current status of the skill-biased technological change argument).
With respect to arguments about inequality and growth, an opposite perspective now
seems to hold. That is, rather than correcting inequality through redistribution as a
way of sapping growth, it is the increasing separation of the top segments of the income and wealth distribution from the sinking or static rest that is now feared as a
major hindrance of growth—to say nothing of well-being in a broader sense. See, e.g.,
Roy van der Weide & Branko Milanovic, Inequality Is Bad for Growth of the Poor (But
Not for That of the Rich), 32 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 507, 508, 516, 525 (2018);
Emmanuel Saez, Striking It Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United
States, 1, 7 (Feb. 2020) (unpublished note), https://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/saezUStopincomes-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GNY-HKWM]. Regarding the absolutely
deleterious nature of inequality in and of itself, within the extensive literature, see
generally RICHARD WILKINSON & KATE PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL: WHY GREATER
EQUALITY MAKES SOCIETIES STRONGER (2011); RICHARD WILKINSON & KATE
PICKETT, THE INNER LEVEL: HOW MORE EQUAL SOCIETIES REDUCE STRESS, RESTORE
SANITY AND IMPROVE EVERYONE’S WELL-BEING (2019).
120
See supra notes 118–119; see also PIKETTY, supra note 36, at 388–90; Thomas
Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Inequality in the Long Run, 344 SCIENCE 838, 838–43
(2014); Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Distributional National
Accounts: Methods and Estimates for the United States, 133 Q.J. ECON. 553, 577–81
(2018); RICHARD V. REEVES, DREAM HOARDERS: HOW THE AMERICAN UPPER MIDDLE
CLASS IS LEAVING EVERYONE ELSE IN THE DUST, WHY THAT IS A PROBLEM, AND WHAT
TO DO ABOUT IT 6 (2017) (setting forth a recent perspective that looks at impacts on
broader well-being).
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others who were assembling relevant data during the muchcelebrated prosperity of the Clinton years.121 The qualitative
aspect of the picture was colored in by various others, including
journalists and advocates, among whom it was becoming common
to speak of the emergence of a new “working poor.”122 Already by
the turn of the millennium the overall portrait was sharply at odds
with the default image of generalized middle-class prosperity. By
the mid-1990s, this prosperity still had an air of timelessness,
although its roots really went back only so far as the gains that
workers in the United States had achieved in the quarter century
between 1945 and 1970 or 1975.123 As concerning the periodization
of mounting inequality, therefore, it should not be doubted that it
substantially predates the Great Recession and even the advent of
post–Cold War globalization.
As for the matter of causation, it is, admittedly, more complex.
One benefit of the earlier discussion building outside of the spotlight in the 1990s is that it was taking place at a time that made
it easier to avoid simplistic explanations based solely on globalization, which was then not only still a new phenomenon but also a
new idea. This earlier state of affairs can profitably be compared
to the discussion that became prevalent after the 2016 presidential
election, which made it ever more common to reflexively equate
inequality with globalization. The dissolution of working-class,
and even middle-class, life in the United States is thus now ubiquitously attributed to a decline of the manufacturing sector due to
the rise of the developing world and, especially, China. (Here,
“China” stands ambiguously both for the People’s Republic of
China after its opening in the 1970s and the more general
liberalization of supply chains and trade and investment flow into
which China has figured so prominently since the end of the Cold
War.) Such explanations are partly appealing, no doubt, because
they dovetail with both liberal and conservative party political
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See Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States,
1913–1998, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1, 4–5, 7, 11 (2003); JAMES K. GALBRAITH, CREATED
UNEQUAL: THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN PAY 133–34 (1998).
122
Catherine S. Chilman, Working Poor Families: Trends, Causes, Effects, and
Suggested Policies, 40 FAM. RELS. 191, 191–92 (1991); Sheldon Danziger & Peter
Gottschalk, Hardly Making It: The Increase in Low Earnings and What To Do About
It, in AMERICA’S WORKING POOR 69, 70 (Thomas R. Swartz & Kathleen Maas Weigert
eds., 1995); BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: ON (NOT) GETTING BY IN
AMERICA 59 (2001).
123
See BRENNER, supra note 8, at 43–45. It is this roughly quarter century that
historians dub the so-called golden age of capitalism, not without a reason.
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ideology in the United States. That is, as a sound bite, the rise-ofChina narrative can be invoked from the right to allege that we
are being exploited by some them that is taking our jobs, with them
being flexible enough to comprise people in China, specifically, the
developing world more generally, or their “globalist” allies at
home. Meanwhile, on the liberal end of the party political spectrum, the rise-of-China narrative provides a way to lament the
plight of the American worker while still concluding, overall, that
globalization should be vindicated as the presumptive agency behind bringing hundreds of millions, if not billions, out of poverty,
in accord with our unquestionable commitment to a better
international order.124
Side by side with the rise-of-China explanation for inequality,
in recent years another has been emerging as well, albeit one that
seems to appeal primarily to those on the liberal—or liberalizing—
end of the spectrum. On this view, the decline of working and even
middle-class life is attributed to job losses from technological
automation—more than offshoring, free trade, or people in the
developing world taking what is ours. Certainly, the explanation
from automation cannot simply be disregarded.125 However, it is
clearly oversimplifying to the extent that its basis in the available
evidence is far outstripped by the media frenzy concerning artifi-

124

Clearly, the questions of if, how, and why global poverty has been changing are
complex. To the extent that poverty can be said to be decreasing, the cause cannot be
accounted for in as reductive a way as it often is when citing to vaguely defined notions
of “globalization” or “liberalization.” This, moreover, is to put aside the outsized effect
on the data of China—with what, after all, has remained its state-run economy—and
to a lesser extent, India. See, e.g., Amartya Sen, Indian Development: Lessons and
Non-Lessons, DAEDALUS, Fall 1989, at 369, 370, 372; Y.Y. Kueh, Mao and Agriculture
in China’s Industrialization: Three Antitheses in a 50-Year Perspective, 187 CHINA Q.
700, 701 (2006); Angus Deaton, Price Indexes, Inequality, and the Measurement of
World Poverty, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 5, 31–32 (2010); Sanjay Reddy & Rahul Lahoti,
$1.90 a Day: What Does It Say? The New International Poverty Line, 97 NEW LEFT
REV. 106, 118–19 (2016); Martin Kirk & Jason Hickel, Gates Foundation’s RoseColored World View Not Supported by Evidence, HUMANOSPHERE (Mar. 20, 2017),
http://www.humanosphere.org/opinion/2017/03/gates-foundations-rose-colored-worldview-not-supported-by-evidence/ [https://perma.cc/5D9R-BVZR]; see generally JASON
HICKEL, THE DIVIDE: A BRIEF GUIDE TO GLOBAL INEQUALITY AND ITS SOLUTIONS
(2017).
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See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu et al., Import Competition and the Great U.S.
Employment Sag of the 2000s, 34 J. Lab. Econ. S141, S163 (2016); David H. Autor,
David Dorn & Gordon H. Hanson, Untangling Trade and Technology: Evidence from
Local Labour Markets, 125 ECON. J. 621, 624, 626, 643–44 (2015); Allan CollardWexler & Jan De Loecker, Reallocation and Technology: Evidence from the U.S. Steel
Industry, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 131, 132 (2015).
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cially intelligent robot futures it plays into.126 Indeed, the fervor
with which such explanations have been embraced in the United
States since the 2016 presidential election is reminiscent of the
way that talk of skill-biased technological change proliferated in
the early 2000s and, in the process, was erroneously used to
explain away increasing income inequality as nothing more than
the product of varying information technology competence among
different segments of the labor force.127

126
The snowballing pace of coverage around the 2016 presidential election in the
United States often drew on the same hardly novel handful of studies as evidence.
See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller, As Robots Grow Smarter, American Workers Struggle To
Keep Up, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/16/upshot/asrobots-grow-smarter-american-workers-struggle-to-keep-up.html [https://perma.cc/23A2NXJS]; Steve Denning, Do Trade Agreements Kill Jobs?, FORBES (Mar. 8, 2016, 3:39
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2016/03/08/should-we-blame-tradeagreements-for-loss-of-jobs/ [https://perma.cc/E957-4BDF]; Allison Burke, What Is the
Future of Free Trade? 5 Facts About U.S. Trade Policy, BROOKINGS NOW (Nov. 18,
2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2016/11/18/what-is-the-future-offree-trade-5-facts-about-us-trade-policy/ [https://perma.cc/7TKL-JBCA]; Claire Cain
Miller, The Long-Term Jobs Killer Is Not China. It’s Automation, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/21/upshot/the-long-term-jobs-killer-is-notchina-its-automation.html [https://perma.cc/S7CE-TWDY]. But see Adams Nager,
Trade vs. Productivity: What Caused U.S. Manufacturing’s Decline and How To Revive
It, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. 1–2 (Feb. 2017), http://www2.itif.org/2017trade-vs-productivity.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7VZ-YZL9] (rebuking media simplification).
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See Mishel, Shierholz & Schmitt, supra note 119, at 4–7 (considering the current status of such theories); see generally Aaron Benanav, Automation and the Future
of Work (pt. 1), 119 NEW LEFT REV. 5 (2019), https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii119/
articles/aaron-benanav-automation-and-the-future-of-work-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
62VC-NQLK]; Aaron Benanav, Automation and the Future of Work (pt. 2), 120 NEW
LEFT REV. 117 (2019), https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii120/articles/aaron-benanavautomation-and-the-future-of-work-2 [https://perma.cc/4WAS-HYC9]. This, of course,
is not to say that the “robots” argument is the same—or supported to the same
extent—for all forms of automation. It is only to say that media frenzy around such
themes, as much as the empirical determinacy of the data, is what drives
oversimplification. Cf. DOUG HENWOOD, AFTER THE NEW ECONOMY (2005) (presenting a study of the frenzy of the early 2000s around the supposed imminence of work’s
transformation by new technologies). Within the technical economic literature, the
leading exponent of the skills-biased technological change focus as the source of
growing inequality is, perhaps, David Autor. See, e.g., David H. Autor, Lawrence F.
Katz, Melissa S. Kearney, Trends in U.S. Wage Inequality: Revising the Revisionists,
90 REV. ECON. & STAT. 300 (2008); David H. Autor, Skills, Education, and the Rise of
Earnings Inequality Among the “Other 99 Percent,” 344 SCIENCE 843 (2014). For a
discussion of countervailing evidence from other recent technical work see Kate Bahn,
Education Won’t Solve Inequality, SLATE (May 30, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://slate.com/
human-interest/2018/05/study-unions-increasingly-represent-educated-workers.html
[https://perma.cc/Q45S-N9CE] (citing Henry S. Farber et al., Unions and Inequality
over the Twentieth Century: New Evidence from Survey Data (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Rsch., Working Paper No. 24587, 2018)).
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Discussion of the timing and antecedents of our present era
would thus better begin from facts that started emerging already
from the mid-1970s. Among the most prominent of such facts are
the stagnation of real wages for all but the top ten to twenty
percent of the workforce by the end of that decade, corresponding
gains in productivity in the decades after that were maintained in
substantial part through increased working hours, and two other
key mechanisms that functioned, until the onset of the Great
Recession, to generally mask decades-long deterioration in the
quality of economic life for working-class households and all but
the top quintile of middle-class households.128 The first of these
mechanisms had to do with the possibility—at least until early in
the 1990s—of increasing household, if not individual, income
through more women coming into the labor force, a phenomenon
leading to the generalized rise of the two-paycheck family. As for
the second mechanism that provisionally masked the effects of
increasing wealth and income inequality, it had to do with the
growing availability of cheap credit.129
With this second mechanism, we also come to another causal
factor behind economic polarization that dominant sound bites
tend to ignore. This has to do with the increasing proportion of
future income from production that has been absorbed since the
end of the 1970s by the so-called FIRE sector. By now there is
ample reason to suspect that growing dependence on cheap credit
for consumption, and even subsistence, has ultimately been made
possible by recycling the very wealth and income that has been
redistributed upward to the effect of fueling increasing inequality
in the first place. Indeed, as often noted, upward redistribution
has been especially targeted toward the financial heights of the
economy.130
128
Lawrence Mishel, Causes of Wage Stagnation, ECON. POL’Y INST. 1 (Jan. 6,
2015), https://files.epi.org/2013/causes_of_wage_stagnation.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5JUQR4G]; Lawrence Mishel, Elise Gould & Josh Bivens, Wage Stagnation in Nine
Charts, ECON. POL’Y INST. 4 (Jan. 6, 2015), https://files.epi.org/2013/wage-stagnationin-nine-charts.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BUN-KDH3].
129
The Productivity-Pay Gap, ECON. POL’Y INST., http://www.epi.org/productivitypay-gap/ [https://perma.cc/3VZQ-M797] (last updated July 2019); RICHARD D. WOLFF,
CAPITALISM HITS THE FAN: THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC MELTDOWN AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT 153–54 (2d ed. 2013).
130
See sources cited supra notes 8, 38; see also Bradford M. Van Arnum & Michele
I. Naples, Financialization and Income Inequality in the United States, 1967–2010, 72
AM. J. ECON. & SOCIO. 1158, 1165 (2013); Ken-Hou Lin & Donald Tomaskovic-Devey,
Financialization and U.S. Income Inequality, 1970–2008, 118 AM. J. SOCIO. 1284,
1289, 1313 (2013); Eckhard Hein, Finance-Dominated Capitalism and Redistribution
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B. Debt, Mortgage Securitization, and the FIRE Sector
The resort to cheap credit to make household ends meet was
already becoming evident in the 1980s. That era, of course, witnessed the escalating ubiquity of the credit card or plastic economy
as well as an explosion in home equity loans after the 1986 Tax
Reform Act and the increasing resort to using one’s home as an
ATM.131 It also gave us the cultural trope of the supersized—and
even spendthrift—American consumer and the associated emergence on television and radio of the personal finance expert and
advice industry.132 Also highly visible was the rise of student debt
as the preferred means of financing tuition increases that were
outpacing inflation at institutions of higher education.133 Another
sign of the times, of course, was the rise of the bank fee–cum–toll
booth economy that we are still growing accustomed to. Indeed,
according to Harvard Business School’s Robin Greenwood and
David Scharfstein, between 1980 and 2012 the financial services
industry—a category they confine to the activities of asset
management and household credit provision professionals alone—
has increased its share of United States gross domestic product
(“GDP”) from 4.9% to 7.9%.134
Less culturally visible but even more significant in the 1980s
was the meteoric rise of structured finance, with its everincreasing array of individually tailored products for high-end
investors. Among these products were both the first notable form
of credit card debt securitization135 and the early expansion of the
securitization of residential and commercial mortgage debt. The
latter took place through the mortgage-backed security—a rechris-

of Income: A Kaleckian Perspective 2–4 (Levy Econ. Inst., Working Paper No. 746,
2013), http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_746.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CCP-GQJG].
131
See, e.g., Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the American Dream: A
Critical Evaluation of the Federal Government’s Promotion of Home Equity Financing,
69 TUL. L. REV. 373, 380–81 (1994); HYMAN, supra note 33, at 234–36.
132
See SCHOR, supra note 33, at 18–21, 24.
133
JOEL BEST & ERIC BEST, THE STUDENT LOAN MESS: HOW GOOD INTENTIONS
CREATED A TRILLION-DOLLAR PROBLEM 47–48 (2014); Susanne Soederberg, Student
Loans, Debtfare and the Commodification of Debt: The Politics of Securitization and
the Displacement of Risk, 40 CRITICAL SOCIO. 689, 696–700 (2014); Charlie Eaton et
al., The Financialization of U.S. Higher Education, 14 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 507, 513–
14, 529 (2016).
134
Robin Greenwood & David Scharfstein, The Growth of Finance, 27 J. ECON.
PERSPS. 3, 3–4 (2013). The peak year was 2006, when GDP share was 8.3%. Id. at 3.
135
Between 1989, when the Federal Reserve began keeping records, and 1991, ten
percent of consumer installment debt—in autos and revolving loans—was securitized.
See JACK RASMUS, EPIC RECESSION: PRELUDE TO GLOBAL DEPRESSION 209 (2010).
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tened and, eventually, vastly scaled-up form of the pre–Great
Depression mortgage bond.136 Sidelined since the 1920s,137 the
mortgage bond’s initial return came as a means of raising housing
finance directly from the capital markets to fund the Fair Housing
Act (“FHA”) of 1968’s section 235 program, which aimed to extend
credit to promote inner-city home ownership after the urban
unrest of the late 1960s.138 Though the section 235 program effectively ended by the early 1970s amidst allegations of fraud
against the African American borrowers who were its intended
beneficiaries, the revivification of mortgage securitization was
sustained by the new Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(“Freddie Mac”).139
Freddie Mac had been created in 1970 to facilitate the
development of a secondary market in conventional mortgages140
by purchasing and bundling into securities loans originated by
savings and loans banks rather than mortgage companies. It thus
complemented the function of the Federal National Mortgage
Association (“FNMA” or “Fannie Mae”) and its counterpart, the
Government National Mortgage Association (“GNMA” or “Ginnie
Mae”).141 Ginnie Mae had initially specialized in an early form of
the revived mortgage bond—known more specifically as the
mortgage “pass[-]through[ ]” security. It was this same type of
security, then, that Freddie Mac initially draw upon to help
sustain initiatives like the section 235 program.142 Fannie Mae,
on the other hand, would not issue its own initial mortgage pass-

136
FRANK J. FABOZZI & FRANCO MODIGLIANI, MORTGAGE AND MORTGAGEBACKED SECURITIES MARKETS 18–19, 23, 28–29, 34 (1992). A form of competitive
mortgage securitization had emerged—and failed—once previously as well in the late
nineteenth-century. See Michael Simkovic, Competition and Crisis in Mortgage
Securitization, 88 IND. L.J. 213, 216–18 (2013).
137
William N. Goetzmann & Frank Newman, Securitization in the 1920s, 1, 18
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 15650, 2010).
138
See LOUIS HYMAN, DEBTOR NATION: THE HISTORY OF AMERICA IN RED INK
229–30 (2011).
139
See HYMAN, supra note 33, at 197.
140
Id. at 203; HYMAN, supra note 138, at 231. Freddie Mac was created through
the Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970.
141
Fannie Mae originated as a New Deal–era government-sponsored entity
created in 1938 to buy mortgages from depository institutions and, in effect, to
federally insure them. It was through the 1968 FHA that Fannie Mae was made into
a fully private corporation and split in two. Alongside the entity that kept its name
was Ginnie Mae, which became a wholly owned government corporation focused on
FHA and other government-insured mortgages. See FABOZZI & MODIGLIANI, supra
note 136, at 19–20, 23.
142
Id. at 21–22.
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through bond, which did officially bear the name of a “mortgagebacked securit[y],” until 1981.143 By 1983, however, Freddie Mac
would become the key backer of the first collateralized mortgage
obligation (“CMO”), a more exotic subtype of the conventional
pass-through variety of the MBS.144
Even so, it was not until the late 1990s—after an early part of
the decade spent still in the shadow of the Savings & Loans and
junk bond crises of the 1980s—that the MBS truly began to emerge
as a structurally significant new means for asserting financial
ownership claims over revenue streams routed through real
estate.145 In 1997, the stage was set for the sharp run up that
began in 2001 when regulators cleared the way for private label
residential MBS (“RMBS”) products. Private label securitization,
in turn, became instrumental in the parallel rise of so called credit
creating shadow banks beyond the reach of the Federal Reserve,
with the shadow banks themselves then stimulating further
securitization.146 By the early 1990s, for example, of the roughly
one trillion dollars in outstanding home mortgage debt—a total
that was similar to the figure for 2000—only thirty-five percent
143

Id. at 23.
Id. at 25. The first CMO was created for Freddie Mac by the investment banks
Solomon Brothers and First Boston. The special purpose entity (“SPE”) issuing the
CMO holds multiple pools of securities and then offers tranches for potential investor
purchase. See Laura Choi, Creating a Marketplace: Information Exchange and the
Secondary Market for Community Development Loans 39 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of S.F. Cmty.
Dev. Inv. Ctr., Working Paper No. 2007-01, 2007), https://www.frbsf.org/communitydevelopment/files/wp07-011.pdf [https://perma.cc/88E8-AEVK]. The tranches represent categorizations based on different risk and maturity dates—allowing for the
further splitting of the underlying loans in various ways. See Andrew Kelman,
Mortgage-Backed Securities and Collateralized Mortgage Obligations: Prudent CRA
Investment Opportunities, CMTY. INVS. (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of S.F., S.F., Cal.), Mar. 2002,
at 20, 22, https://www.frbsf.org/community-development/files/mbs.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Z7AR-DEJM]. CMOs thus differ in several ways from the class of conventional passthrough securities that usually take the name of “mortgage-backed securities,” a
category to which they both, technically, belong. Overall, one can think of the CMO as
derivative of the plain vanilla pass-through MBS, including insofar as the CMO can
pool conventional MBSs together. By the latter half of the 1980s, because most CMOs
were issued by real estate mortgage investment conduits (“REMIC”) the terms CMO
and REMIC became largely synonymous. Id.
145
See RASMUS, supra note 135, at 205, 208.
146
Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100
GEO. L.J. 1177, 1182–83 (2012). The term “shadow banks” encompasses various
financial intermediaries arising especially after the 1990s, including investment
banks, insurance companies, hedge and private pension funds, real estate investment
trusts, private equity firms, and the new financial wings of large corporations like
General Motors. See RASMUS, supra note 135, at 212–13. Among what made their
credit creation activities possible was the elimination or reduction of minimum
reserve requirements of the kind that restricts ordinary commercial banks. Id. at 213.
144
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was securitized—most of this being sold to Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac.147 Of the some ten trillion dollars in home mortgage
debt attached to residential property by 2008148—approximately
four trillion dollars of which was issued between 2002 and 2006
alone, including some half that being sub-prime149—some ninety
percent of the total was securitized with about fifty percent coming
through private-label MBS activity.150
Real estate has thus played a major role in fueling the FIRE
sector. Indeed, real estate has long comprised the largest asset
category in most, if not all, economies,151 a striking fact relative to
what classical economists like Mill assumed about the likely policy
fate of land’s “unearned increment.”152 Of course, this first fact
cannot be separated from a second that is just as important—
namely, that in the United States, as well as countries like Canada
and Australia, in the recent past mortgage lending has comprised
as much as approximately eighty percent of bank loans.153
Consequently, it is lending against built structures and especially
land—as national income accounting practices tend to obscure by
not properly disaggregating these distinct components of real
estate prices—rather than productive capital investment that has
driven credit expansion.154 In turn, it is also the quintessential
form of property in land that has enabled further debt to be issued
against other assets—as well as for debt initially created against
real estate to move toward those other assets.155 The final element
147

RASMUS, supra note 135, at 209; Fligstein & Goldstein, supra note 7, at 59

fig.2.
148
Andrea Riquier, What the Shrinking Amount of Mortgage Debt Tells Us About
the Housing Market, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 23, 2016, 8:45 AM), http://www.marketwatch.
com/story/what-the-shrinking-amount-of-mortgage-debt-tells-us-about-the-housingmarket-2016-02-22 [https://perma.cc/93PK-UVLF]; WOLFF, supra note 129, at 145.
149
RASMUS, supra note 135, at 211.
150
Fligstein & Goldstein, supra note 7, at 23, 59 fig.2.
151
Hudson, supra note 64, at 250; SAMUEL STEIN, CAPITAL CITY: GENTRIFICATION
AND THE REAL ESTATE STATE 2 (2019).
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See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
153
HUDSON, supra note 64, at 250.
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MIAN & SUFI, supra note 33, at 80–81 (considering arguments questioning the
pitting of housing debt against so-called “animal spirits” as the real driver of credit
expansion). Within the existing literature, one also finds researchers pressing the case
for another variety of intellectual uncertainty—over whether new mortgage products
pushed housing prices to rise as opposed to whether such products emerged due to
market participants expecting ongoing appreciation. See Morris A. Davis & Stijn Van
Nieuwerburgh, Housing, Finance, and the Macroeconomy, in 5B HANDBOOK OF
REGIONAL AND URBAN ECONOMICS 753, 804 (Gilles Duranton, J. Vernon Henderson
& William C. Strange eds., 2015).
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See infra text accompanying notes 170–171.
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within the networked relation between the parts of the FIRE
sector—meaning, the I for “insurance”—also runs in no small part
through real estate, whether because mortgage lending necessitates the purchase of home insurance, because growing insurance
company reserves get directed back into real estate, or because
banks swollen from real estate lending acquire or merge with
insurance companies.156
C. Financial Asset-Price Inflation
One prerequisite for grappling with the growth of the FIRE
sector since the 1970s—including the attendant proliferation of
financial proprietorship claims on other assets—is that we move
past the notional idea that debt is simply going toward investment
in productive assets.157 Highly idealized, this idea captures neither the dynamics driving household debt expansion in the real
world nor the preference for debt leverage that became so visible
on corporate balance sheets starting in the 1980s and that has
been so visibly apart of the post–Great Recession era of easy
money.158 Putting aside other forms of government debt, nor does
it do well in capturing the related rise of securitization.
This, of course, is not to say that finance, including through
debt, can have no place in bridging gaps that would otherwise
prevent ordinary consumers from making purchases or firms from
investing in plants and equipment. Nor is it to say that the financial sector floats freely of the real economy. Indeed, to highlight
how land was central rather than incidental to originally ground156

HUDSON, supra note 31, at 150–52, 161.
At least at the margins of orthodox theory, this view has become highly
questionable. See, e.g., William Easterly, Roumeen Islam & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Shaken
and Stirred: Explaining Growth Volatility, 2000 ANN. WORLD BANK CONF. ON DEV.
ECON. 191, 208 n.4, http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/525851468740663147/
pdf/multi0page.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YAG-H7PK]; Jean-Louis Arcand, Enrico Berkes
& Ugo Panizza, Too Much Finance? 24 (Int’l Monetary Fund Working Paper, No.
WP/12/161, 2012); see also Greenwood & Scharfstein, supra note 134, at 5–6 (working,
however, from the more traditional sense of unreserved optimism about finance’s
benefits).
158
Since the Great Recession, the prioritization of using newly printed money to
keep financial asset prices high—and still inflating—has meant corporate debt
remains as important as ever. Beyond the sums indirectly channeled into the five to
six trillion dollars in stock buybacks and dividend payments, low interest rates and
free money policy have meant an ongoing explosion in the corporate bond market. This
has included a large expansion in the market for “junk” bonds issued by the very large
percentage of corporations with performance problems. See JACK RASMUS, CENTRAL
BANKERS AT THE END OF THEIR ROPE? MONETARY POLICY AND THE COMING
DEPRESSION 318–19 (2017); Reid et al., supra note 39, at 24, 29–30.
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ing the idea of property-as-rent is to suggest precisely the opposite.
Then there is also the fact that complex structured products like
the CMO could not exist absent the abstraction of housing, in all
its physicality, into another type of property.159 That said, to
question the oversimplified idea that debt is merely going toward
productive investment is to say that starting from our actual
empirical-historical situation is a must. For example, as has been
known for some time, in both Europe and the United States, it is
through current earnings—rather than external means, whether
on the debt or stock markets—that most corporations finance
actual capital investment.160 Indeed, in this regard, the points
reviewed at the end of Section III.B about the overwhelming
importance of real estate lending become even more striking.
Where, then, has the mass of new funds, which appeared as
capital until the Great Recession threatened their evaporation,
gone? In the remainder of Section III.C, I will discuss the idea of
debt-driven asset-price inflation as one likely answer. As is now
finally being recognized, since the 1980s firms have directed
increasingly available financial resources not to investment or
wage growth but to activities like stock buybacks, dividend
payments,161 corporate takeovers, and so on.162 Through such activities directing debt or credit garnished from elsewhere in the
economy to the purchase of already existing assets, there has been
a marked effect of inflating their values. As economist Dirk
Bezemer puts it, beyond “financing innovation,” what Joseph
Schumpeter called “the secondary wave” of credit thus becomes
159

Kelman, supra note 144, at 22.
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at 2, 5–6.
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REV., Jan.–Feb. 2010, at 58, 59–60; LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 3,
5 (2012). The issue was also treated extensively in the 1990s. See HENWOOD, supra
note 8, at 264–65, 269–74. See also supra note 147 and accompanying text.
160

2020]

PROPERTY AS RENT

411

speculative once it gravitates toward “assets already in place,
rather than new production.”163
Outside of the world of corporate finance, the same is even
more dramatically evident in the real estate context—at least
“assuming that mortgages finance transactions in existing real
estate rather than new building” as, in point of fact, Bezemer notes
“is mostly . . . the case.”164 Indeed, here it is worth recalling that
as President Obama’s Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission found,
during the peak years of the explosion in mortgage lending from
2001 to 2004, by far the most debt issued was to refinance the
mortgages of existing homeowners rather than those of new purchasers, a category that would not, at any rate, be restricted to
purchasers of new constructions.165 The fact that such a large
share of lending was devoted to refinancing existing mortgages
may have been one reason why the post-2007 foreclosure crisis hit
African Americans—especially, elderly African American women
homeowners—particularly hard.166
Consider the economist Michael Hudson’s calculation that
some eighty percent of asset-price gains—a concept he distinguishes from capital gains in the tax code—occurred in the real
estate sector, with the remainder going to bonds and stocks.167
Using Federal Reserve Flow of Funds data, he notes that in 2007
the rise in price for the country’s raw land rose by $2.5 trillion, a
figure that comes to more than twenty percent of national
income.168 As for the distinction between asset-price gains and
capital gains, it is important because the latter are only declared
for tax purposes if considered “realized.” Even putting aside the
163
Dirk J. Bezemer, Schumpeter Might Be Right Again: The Functional
Differentiation of Credit, 24 J. EVOLUTIONARY ECON. 935, 938 (2014). As Bezemer
notes, Schumpeter’s idea was not restricted to real estate assets already in place but
existing assets in general. See id.; see also RASMUS, supra note 39, at 398–400
(discussing the famed heterodox economist Hyman Minsky’s distinct, but in ways
compatible, idea of economies entering stages of “Ponzi” finance).
164
Bezemer, supra note 163.
165
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT: THE MORTGAGE
CRISIS 5 (2010), https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/historical/fct/fcic/fcic_report_
prelim_mortgage_20100407.pdf [https://perma.cc/FW89-JMF4].
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See, e.g., Gary Dymski, Jesus Hernandez & Lisa Mohanty, Race, Gender,
Power, and the U.S. Subprime Mortgage and Foreclosure Crisis: A Meso Analysis, 19
FEMINIST ECON. 124, 135–38 (2013) (discussing how lenders targeted minorities
during the mortgage crisis); Landy, supra note 38, at 6.
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Bubble Economy, 1 WORLD REV. POL. ECON. 81, 85 (2010). Hudson’s own refinement
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decades-long decline in the tax rates applied to capital gains, the
category simply excludes “unrealized” real estate gains like those
that result from the transfer of property on death or from sales
proceeds that are then put into new purchases. This, moreover, is
not even taking into account the various other ways that decades
of tax policy has altogether removed residential and commercial
real estate from effective taxation, thus freeing up potential
government revenue to be used instead for the purposes of creating
financial property-in-rent that is ultimately transformed into
bank interest.169
As another example, consider that from 2001 to 2005—at the
peak of the last housing bubble—low interest rates and escalating
house price values allowed homeowners in the United States to
extract one trillion dollars per year from their houses after closing
costs and mortgage payments.170 Triple the annual amount of the
previous decade, approximately half of this total went back into
the housing market through new home purchases—though not
necessarily purchases of new constructions—and improvements;
another quarter went to non-home financial assets; and of the
remaining quarter devoted to personal consumption, even much of
this still went to paying credit card, auto loan, and student loan
debt.171
In all of these ways, therefore, the vast expansion of derivative
financial asset forms staking ownership claims directly or indirectly on real estate value—that itself is generated out of more basic
169

Id. at 87. As for the other key elements of tax policy, they include the ability of
commercial real estate owners to repeatedly, and on an accelerated basis, write off tax
costs through depreciating assets that are in fine repair—and when they can no longer
do so, re-transfer them to new owners who can do the same—the notorious tax-sheltercreating effect of the home mortgage interest deduction, and others. See id. at 96; see
also KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE
UNITED STATES, 190–91 (1985); Joseph J. Thorndike, How Tax Law Fertilized
America’s “Crabgrass Frontier,” 146 TAX NOTES 1439, 1439–40 (2015). Recent
technical studies have approached the mortgage deduction from the standpoint of its
negative “welfare effects.” See Davis & Van Nieuwerburgh, supra note 154, at 800–
02. On changes to the deduction made under the Trump administration, see Jim
Tankersley & Ben Casselman, As Mortgage-Interest Deduction Vanishes, Housing
Market Offers a Shrug, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/
04/business/economy/mortgage-interest-deduction-tax.html [https://perma.cc/Z9US25BG].
170
Landy, supra note 38, at 2.
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Id. (noting that by 2012, six trillion dollars in housing value disappeared). See
also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV.
963, 967 (2009) (providing similar estimates for the period “between mid-2006 and the
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forms like the home mortgage loan—bring to mind the nineteenthcentury identity between property’s quintessentially most irreducible form, in land, and rent. Indeed, as I turn to directly, insofar
as landed property can be disaggregated from built structures in
the pricing of real estate, credit’s acceleration into asset-price
inflation—rather than productive investment—only further
reminds us of why the now largely forgotten conception of
property-as-rent was so vital in the first place.
IV. THE SINGLE-FAMILY RENTAL-BACKED
SECURITY AND DEBT-DRIVEN PROPERTY-AS-RENT
In this final Part of the Article, I open with a discussion of
long-term trends in the composition of home price values in the
residential real estate market in the United States. Using unique
data compiled by the economist Morris Davis, Section IV.A is
organized around a series of graphs looking at both the national
and selected state- or metro-level residential real estate markets.
Through these figures, I show the importance of underlying land
or site price values relative to the cost of built structures and
demonstrate their role as the key driver of increasing home price
values in the residential real estate market. In Section IV.B, I
then turn to the single-family residential rental-backed security
as one new example of our ongoing reliance on securitized financial
asset property built on real estate value. Section IV.C then concludes by discussing some normative alternatives to our ongoing
reliance on real estate securitization and the new forms of
property-in-rent like the SFRBS it generates.
The conclusion that integrates Part IV’s three subsections
with one another as well as with Parts I to III is worth stating up
front. This is, namely, that disaggregating residential real estate
prices as I do in Section IV.A—so as to isolate the role of the land
value component in driving up home price values—crystallizes the
key policy question that the perspective from property-as-rent
poses. How socially useful is it to inflate real estate prices in the
way our legal system has encouraged by providing tax breaks for
accumulating mortgage debt, in the residential real estate context,
and other interest payments, especially in the commercial real
estate context, through allowing for accelerated and fictitious
depreciation? To do so might make sense if the reason for running
up real estate debt—whether in the form of an ordinary homeowner taking out a mortgage or a private equity firm using leverage to buy up foreclosed homes to lease back to the foreclosed—
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was rooted in “rising construction costs” functioning to “increase
the cost of buildings and other capital improvements.”172 However,
if higher real estate prices “simply reflect higher prices for land
sites that have no cost of production,” then using tax policy to
facilitate the inflation of those prices is “merely [to] make[ ] new
buyers” and non-owner-occupying tenants “pay more,” in mortgage
and rental payments, respectively.173 In other words, the less that
the growth of real estate prices comes from investing in new
construction and capital improvements, the less can it be argued
that “rising property prices elicit more investment in the form of
construction activity.”174 Moreover, if the growth of real estate
price values is really coming from “bid[ding] up” land prices, it is
not the case that more land, as a limited asset “provided freely by
nature,” will somehow come into supply.175 Rather, the activity of
providing the homes, office buildings, and industrial plants that
already sit atop such land will garner an increasing economic rent.
Consequently, it would make more sense to shift to a policy portfolio geared toward taxing away this economic rent rather than
facilitating its insulation from taxation. Of course, there is one
way that rising prices for underlying land or sites could be made
to coincide with an increase in its supply, so to speak. This occurs
when more public goods investment—in schools, transport networks, and the like—increases the supply of attractive land sites.
Such a possibility, however, would only strengthen the case for
shifting our policy portfolio, given that, as “has long been argued,”
the “public sector should recover the cost of this infrastructure by
taxing” the resulting “increase” in land’s “site value[ ] along the
[more attractive] route.”176
A.

The Increasing Importance of Land’s Site Value

Using pre-crisis data, Morris A. Davis and Jonathan Heathcoate
estimate the total market value of housing stock in the United
States in 2005 as summing to $24.1 trillion—some one hundred
and fifty percent of the combined capitalization of the major stock
exchanges.177 In pointing to this fact, they have been among the
172

Hudson, supra note 168, at 99–100.
Id. at 100.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
Morris A. Davis & Jonathan Heathcote, The Price and Quantity of Residential
Land in the United States, 54 J. MONETARY ECON. 2595, 2596 (2007). This includes
173
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most prominent economists to argue for the consequent importance of disaggregating housing into a bundle of two different
components: structures, on the one hand, and land or sites, on the
other. Within this distinction there is another they intend as well,
according to which house or home prices should ideally be decomposed into a weighted average of the cost of produced structures
and the price of unproduced land or sites. Accordingly, in their
pioneering 2007 paper, Davis and Heathcoate employ a method for
isolating land price values from home price values by subtracting
the explicitly determinable replacement costs of structures, after
accounting for depreciation. Qualitatively speaking, as the authors
explain, the residual “land” price data that is inferred from this
method can be thought of as “anything that makes a house worth
more than the cost of putting up a new structure of similar size
and quality on a vacant lot.”178 This indirect method for determining land price values through inference from house prices and
structure costs, as they explain, is necessary to avoid what are
otherwise likely to be intractable direct measurement problems.179
While significant limitations remain on this indirect method
for determining land price values, especially ones that may underestimate their magnitude,180 Davis and Heathcoate have provided
a series comprising the first constant-quality price and quantity
indexes for total United States residential land stock.181 Their key
purpose in doing so has been to help us better “explore[ ] the evoowner-occupied, rental, and vacant units. Id. at 2603 n.16. Davis has also constructed
an assessment of all land values in the United States. See Morris A. Davis, The Price
and Quantity of Land by Legal Form of Organization in the United States, 39 REG’L
SCI. & URB. ECON. 350 (2009).
178
Davis & Heathcoate, supra note 177, at 2595. As they further explain, while
they use the Bureau of Economic Affairs’ (“BEA”) published series for replacement
costs as their basis to estimate structure values, they remove the accumulated value
of commissions from existing home sales (which the BEA counts as part of residential
investment) because it does not increase the stock of structures in place. The result is
to reduce the BEA’s estimates by about 8.5%. Id. at 2601.
179
Id. at 2596 (explaining that the intractability derives from the fact that except
for “land sales at the undeveloped fringes of metro areas—where land is relatively
cheap—there are very few direct observations of land prices from vacant lot sales,
because most desirable residential locations have already been built on”).
180
See infra note 196.
181
See Davis & Heathcoate, supra note 177. The authors also review the most
prominent of the few earlier attempts to estimate land price values, including data for
home versus site prices for properties for which the FHA was the mortgage issuer—
producing discernible estimates for the years between 1935 and 1979—and A.D.
Manvel’s well-known land versus improvements estimates for real estate parcels in
twelve large assessment areas from the late 1960s. See id. at 2605; Allen D. Manvel,
Land Use in 106 Large Cities, in THREE LAND RESEARCH STUDIES 18, 19 (1968).

416

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:363

lution of land and structures prices separately” so as to “make[ ]
it . . . easier to understand the dynamics of house prices.”182
Indeed, as they note in their paper, doing so allows real estate’s
demand side to be differentiated into “a capital input in home
production and leisure activities,” composed of the structure cost,
and a separate source, the land price, that represents the
“capitaliz[ation of] the market value of local schools and the
commuting distance from employment centers.”183 Assessed from
the supply side, as they note, the distinction between land or,
equivalently, as I have also put it, site prices and structure costs
proves “even more stark.”184 This is because it suggests that “increases in the demand for housing will have very different effects
on the prices of these two components, even if there is no change
in the relative taste for structures versus land.”185 Overall, therefore, the disaggregation of home price values will warn against
expecting changes in demand-side variables like interest rates and
demographics to significantly affect the relative price of structures, which depend on factors like the relative productivity of the
construction industry and materials costs.186 Because “desirable
land is largely non-reproducible,” on the other hand, it is the
opposite that is to be expected with respect to changes in demand
for housing, itself, which is more likely to “have a large effect” in
driving up “the price of land.”187 Especially to the extent that the
demand for housing has, itself, been contingent on the expansion
of housing debt since the 1970s,188 the logic behind Davis and
Heathcoate’s approach coincides with the observations made at
the end of Part II about real estate’s ability to demonstrate the
ongoing vitality of the conception of property-as-rent. That is, separating land from structures demonstrates how dependent real
estate price values—and hence the various forms of new financial
proprietorship claims attaching to them—are on underlying
scarcity premiums associated with land rather than real estate
developer entrepreneurialism.189
The remainder of Section IV.A uses the data that Davis and
Heathcoate have made available to researchers to graphically de182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189

Davis & Heathcoate, supra note 177.
Id. at 2597.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See supra note 154.
See Davis & Heathcoate, supra note 177, at 2613–15, 2618.

2020]

PROPERTY AS RENT

417

pict some relevant long-term trends. Figures 1 to 3 look at relationships between prices for home price values on the residential
real estate market, structure costs, and inferred land or site prices
for the United States as a whole in the period from 1930 to 2000.190
Here, I have adjusted all nominal dollar values in the data to real
year 2000 levels using the Price Consumption Expenditure Index
of the Bureau of Economic Affairs’ National Income and Product
Accounts191 and indexed to 1930.192 Using additional data for the
state and metro area level that Davis has made available to the
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, now hosted by the American
Enterprise Institute, Figures 4 to 6 then drill down below the
national or aggregate level.193 While the state and metro area194
data sets have the benefit of being more current, extending to
2018, they begin only in the mid-1970s and mid-1980s respectively. For the purposes of the Figures 4 to 6, I have also simplified
by using only a single information point for each given year, rather
than the full set of quarterly numbers the data sets include.195
As Figure 1 makes clear, the rapid ascent of home prices in
the residential real estate market did not begin until the early
1970s, a fact that is telling when considered relative to the context
discussed in Part III. As per the central point of Davis and Heathcoate’s exercise, even more important is what Figure 1 shows
190

See Historical Land Price Indicators, AM. ENTER. INST., https://www.aei.org/
historical-land-price-indicators/ [https://perma.cc/2QDM-3SXU] (last visited Dec. 23,
2020) (containing the data set utilized by Davis and Heathcoate in their article, supra
note 177).
191
In using the PCE rather than the CPI or some other index to make the adjustment, the presentation of the data follows the method that Davis and Heathcoate
suggest. See Table 2.3.4. Price Indexes for Personal Consumption Expenditures by
Major Type of Product: Annual, FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS, Line 1, https://fred.
stlouisfed.org/release/tables?rid=53&eid=43831&snid [https://perma.cc/QRF4-UT7W]
(last visited Dec. 23, 2020).
192
The presentation of the data diverges from the authors’. See Davis &
Heathcote, supra note 177, at 2607 fig.1 (beginning from and indexing to 1975).
193
See Annual Historical Dataset, 1930–2000, AM. ENTER. INST., https://www.aei
.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/LANDDATA_HISTORY.xlsx [https://perma.cc/AD3LKDWC] (last visited Dec. 23, 2020).
194
See Quarterly MSA Dataset, 1984:Q1–2018:Q2, AM. ENTER. INST., https://www
.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/LANDDATA.MSA_.2018Q2.xlsx [https://perma.cc/
R9XS-KVWE] (last visited Dec. 23, 2020). The figures in this Article use data up to
January 1, 2016. The metro area data is linked to other work by Davis with the
Federal Reserve Board’s Michael Palumbo. See Morris A. Davis & Michael G.
Palumbo, The Price of Residential Land in Large U.S. Cities, 63 J. URB. ECON. 352,
353 (2008).
195
Figures 2 to 6 do not generally correspond to any that Davis and co-author
present. Therefore, there is no question of if or how their presentation differs from my
own. See, e.g., supra note 192 (demonstrating this in the case of Figure 1).
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about the role of aggregate land price value increases as the key
driver of aggregate home price value increases in the period after
the ascent began. The additional information Figure 2 reveals
about the greater volatility of aggregate land price value as compared to aggregate structure cost value provides a different window into the same point.

Figure 1: Growth in Aggregate Prices of Homes,
Land, and Structures, 1930–2000
That is, Figure 2 shows that fluctuation in aggregate land
price value—deriving from the scarcity premiums associated with
land sites—plays the major role in aggregate home price value
fluctuations in the real estate market. Indeed, apart from the few
years after 1946—when a big drop in aggregate land price values
went hand in hand with an increase in aggregate home price
values due to increasing aggregate structure cost values—it has
been aggregate land price value that has been key in maintaining
or driving up aggregate home price value in the face of declining
aggregate structure cost value. This occurred most dramatically
in the period from 1970 to 1990, when the overall share of
aggregate land price value in aggregate home price value doubled
from twenty to forty percent.196 Throughout this period, repeated
196
Here it is important to make explicit the point alluded to earlier about the
underestimating tendency, even of Davis and Heathcoate’s version, of the residual-ofstructure cost method for inferring land or site prices. As Hudson explains, assessors
in the United States often put the land or site price share in home price values at forty
to as much as sixty percent, the upper end of which pushes well beyond what the
Federal Reserve, also following a residual-of-structure cost method, reaches. The
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bouts of declining aggregate structure cost value were outstripped
by corresponding periods of increasing aggregate land price value.

Figure 2: Percent Change in Prices of Homes,
Land, and Structures, 1931–2000
There is an important related point that Figures 1 to 3 do not
fully make clear, given that the series represented ends in 2000.
As Davis and Heathcoate are able to extrapolate further in their
paper, this is, namely, that this doubling in aggregate land price
value’s share in aggregate home price value was higher than the
corresponding increase that took place amidst the peak years of
the housing bubble of the early 2000s. In the decade from 1996 to
2006, in other words, aggregate land price value’s share in
aggregate home price value increased only about ten percent—
moving from its late 1990s dip down to thirty-four percent to a
2006 level of forty-six percent.197 Among the noteworthy implications of this fact would thus seem to be that the bubble of the 2000s
was neither anomalous nor “unique in history” as has been argued
by many prominent commentators.198
A last aspect of the picture that Figures 1 to 3 help paint has
to do with issues raised in Part III about the inflationary effects of
attaching debt to assets that are already in place. For example, as
Davis and Heathcoate point out, and as Figures 1 to 3 imply, there
are evidently “intrinsic differences in the price dynamics of new
versus existing homes,” with “typical newly built homes and
problem with the Fed’s method is that by “valuing buildings at their reproduction cost,
including capital gains that reflect[ ] rising construction costs” it “leaves an
unrealistically low residual for land.” Moreover, doing so may “make[ ] land prices
appear more volatile than overall real estate.” HUDSON, supra note 64, at 264–65.
197
Davis & Heathcoate, supra note 177, at 2616.
198
Id. at 2617 (citing ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 2 (2d ed.
2005)); see Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, Is the 2007 U.S. Sub-Prime
Financial Crisis So Different? An International Historical Comparison, 98 AM. ECON.
REV. 339, 342 (2008) (considering a different kind of rejoinder).
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existing homes” proving to be “quite different goods.”199 By 2006,
when aggregate land price value reached about half of the
aggregate value of the country’s housing stock, buyers were thus
paying “40% more on average for existing homes relative to newly
built structures of similar size and quality.”200 One inference to
draw from this, of course, is the one that the authors do directly:
namely that “a large fraction of the market value of land under
existing houses reflects the value placed by home-buyers on these
older homes’ locations, and that the locations of newly built
houses, on average, are considered much less desirable.”201 Here,
we should not fail to realize that “the quantity of new
development” was and remains “small relative to the existing
stock of housing.”202 Yet as suggested at the top of this paragraph,
given the fact that aggregate housing price value increasingly
comes from scarcity premiums for sites, and eventually will mainly
do so, there is another possible inference worth considering as
well. This concerns whether new financial forms tied legally to
real estate are proprietary not just because they are rooted in the
value of housing stock but also because they are rooted in
payments of scarcity rent that is routed through it. Indeed, this is
all the more compelling to the extent that such rent overlaps with
the kind of rent that was central to making land the right to
property’s “keystone” form starting at least from the seventeenthcentury, at a time, ironically, that most property scholars would
call “feudal.”203

199

Davis & Heathcoate, supra note 177, at 2608.
Id. at 2608–09.
201
Id. at 2609.
202
Id. at 2613.
203
See Rose, supra note 96, at 334–37. Of course, among historians of medieval
Europe, the “feudal” age proper is often restricted to the period from the ninth to thirteenth centuries. See, e.g., F.L. GANSHOF, FEUDALISM 131–32, 150 (Philip Grierson
trans., 1996).
200
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Figure 3: Aggregate Home Prices: Share of
Structures vs. Share of Land, 1930–2000
Turning briefly to Figures 4 to 6, three points are worth making explicit. First, as expected, despite the limited portrait based
on only six states, the aggregate tendency is corroborated at the
state level as well. That is, as Figure 4 and the solid lines in Figure
6 for each relevant state suggest, after 1975 and 1985 respectively
and until 2006, the land price value component of house price
values increased in every state. In the major metro areas, as
Figure 5 shows, they either increased or remained at a steady high
relative to the overall share of land price values in home price
values for the state each metro area is located. Indeed, notwithstanding the clearly enormous downward ratchet of the bursting
of the last housing bubble, by 2016 the same overall trend was
restored for each of the six states amidst the recovery and reinflation of the housing market after 2012. As Figure 5 suggests,
some metro areas show a land price value component that is yet to
again surpass the 1985 level or pre-2006 low.

Figure 4: Land Prices as Share of Home Prices in
Six States, 1975–2016
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Figure 5: Land Prices as Share of Home Prices for
Six Metros, 1985–2016
Second, both relative to the six states selected and all six
selected metro areas in these states, the central observation from
the aggregate data about land price value being driven by scarcity
premiums is again borne out. That is, it is in the places that
intuition tells us are the hottest real estate markets, and those
which we would informally call the ripest for speculation, that the
scarcity value of sites has paid the highest premiums. This is
evidenced both in the generally greater share that land price value
has played in the prices of homes in these areas and the sharp
ascent of land price value’s share of home price value in boom
times. Indeed, this latter observation applies with respect to both
those states and cities that are conventionally considered to be the
hottest real estate markets. That is, what intuition would tell us
are the most overheated of the six state-level real estate markets—
namely, California, New York, and Florida, or, perhaps, Arizona—
are the ones where land price values in the corresponding states
have made for the highest, and during boom times most sharply
ascending, share of their respective aggregated home price values.
Likewise, what intuition tells us are the most overheated markets
in each of the six states—namely, their respective major metros—
are also areas where the share of land price values relative to home
price values exceeds the share of land price values in home price
values for each respective state as a whole. Finally, as is hinted
in Figure 6, there is another point to emphasize that Davis and
Heathcoate also make: in states where homes are “relatively
expensive (reflecting pricier land), house prices have historically
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been more volatile” while also “appreciat[ing] more rapidly on
average.”204

Figure 6: Land Price as Share of House Prices, City vs. State
B. Securitizing Single-Family Rental Payments: Beyond the
Democratization of Credit
A final feature of the state- and metro area-level trends in
Figures 4 to 6 is worth highlighting as well. This follows from
looking at the Great Recession years, from roughly 2007 to 2012.
As noted in Section IV.A, since 2012, the share of land price values
in the composition of home price values in all six state and metro
areas has resumed its upward trajectory—and has now surpassing
its level during the boom of the mid-1980s in most places. As Davis
and Heathcoate’s analysis makes explicit, and as Figures 4 to 6
also suggest, the post-bubble collapse showed up in the outsize

204

Davis & Heathcoate, supra note 177, at 2618.
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effect of the decline in land price values on the overall decline in
home price values. Of the six states, Arizona is most striking,
which may seem surprising given its land-rich status. Arizona
thus serves as a reminder that scarcity is not just a function of
open land area but also differential public goods investment,
which makes it more appropriate, if less intuitive, to speak of
land’s site scarcity.
There is a second way that Arizona’s trend—inclusive of that
for its major metro area of Phoenix—is telling as well. This is due
to another factor at work in the extended aftermath of the crisis
brought on in 2007—namely, a decline in home price values that
coincided with a rise in the rent-to-price ratio for owner-occupied
housing across the country. That is, as purchasing homes became
less desirable—or, more accurately, unattainable—a greater number of people were in need of renting rather than buying. This is
evident from Figure 7, which is taken directly from another of
Davis’ articles.205 Indeed, it was in states like Arizona and areas
like Phoenix that the more lucrative market for rentals and the
large number of vacant, bank-owned, or underwater homes first
paved the way for the new form of real estate securitization in the
form of the SFRBS.206

Figure 7: Gross Rent-Price Ratio Owner-Occupied
Housing, 1960–2000207
Since their emergence in 2013, SFRBS offerings have grown
and mutated rapidly in structure. Initially, private equity firms

205

Morris A. Davis, Andreas Lehnert & Robert F. Martin, The Rent-Price Ratio
for the Aggregate Stock of Owner-Occupied Housing, 54 REV. INCOME & WEALTH 279,
283 fig.1 (2008).
206
Deirdre Pfeiffer & Joanna Lucio, An Unexpected Geography of Opportunity in
the Wake of the Foreclosure Crisis: Low-Income Renters in Investor-Purchased
Foreclosures in Phoenix, Arizona, 36 URB. GEOGRAPHY 1197, 1213 (2015).
207
See supra note 205.
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like the Blackstone Group were simply buying up single-family
homes left over from the housing crisis at cut-rate prices.208 They
did so to create a new portfolio of real estate owned (“REO”) rental
properties.209 These, in turn, could be leased back to the foreclosed,
among the various others now priced out of the homeownership
market.210 Very quickly, however, private equity firms partnered
with investment banks to prepare a new class of real estate derivatives through the pooling of rental payments from such homes
and slicing them into different tranches with varying levels of
potential risk and reward.211 As with the MBS before it, the new
form of bond property that resulted allowed investment banks to
attract institutional investors like hedge and pension funds to
invest their large quantities of liquid capital—itself garnered
either directly from earned incomes originating elsewhere in the
productive economy or from credit created out of such incomes
elsewhere in the financial economy—in search of yield.212
If 2013 was the turning point for the SFRBS, it was partly
because by then the economy’s ostensible recovery was seeing land
prices resume their historically upward ascent compared to
relatively flat structure prices. The still-high rent-price ratio was
also likely necessary to spark initial investor interest, especially
since ratings agencies like Fitch refused to assign ratings to the
new products due to the absence of historical performance data,
among other reasons.213 Of course, to the extent that the resurgence of house price values suggested that the rent-price ratio
would fall, other trepidations about whether the SFRBS was built
to last resulted from fears specific to the rental market.214 Yet
various reasons for confidence also persisted. These included the
oft-cited shift in the supposed preferences of millennials away
208

Pfeiffer & Lucio, supra note 206, at 1200.
See, e.g., Morgan W. Pierson, REO to Rental: The Creation of a New Asset
Class and the Transformation of the American Single-Family Landscape 17 (Jan. 17,
2014) (M.S. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on file with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Libraries). Relatedly, as Stein notes, by 2016 some “37
percent of home sales were [being] made to absentee investors.” STEIN, supra note
151, at 3.
210
Pierson, supra note 209, at 20.
211
See id. at 50.
212
See id. at 19-20.
213
John Layton, Single-Family Rental Securitizations, PENNSTATE: INST. FOR
REAL EST. STUD. 1, 3 (2015), https://www.smeal.psu.edu/ires/documents/single-familyrental-securitizations-spring-2015 [https://perma.cc/TKK6-QN58].
214
See, e.g., Tracy Alloway, Anjli Raval & Arash Massoudi, Zeal for Blackstone
Home Rental Bond Fades, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2014, 4:50 AM), https://www.ft.com/
content/74447996-8cf2-11e3-ad57-00144feab7de (subscription required).
209

426

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:363

from owning, which are undoubtedly better seen as deriving from
necessity.215 There was also the likelihood that pouring money into
the single-family home market would re-inflate prices and create
a new class of “[p]redatory [r]entals” owned by “Wall Street
landlords” whose distance from tenants would make it easier to
charge assorted new fees and more aggressively push up rates.216
Residents of Colony Capital’s Colony Starwood homes in Los
Angeles, for example, have had to absorb a nine- to thirteenpercent increase in payment rates to stay in their homes.217
All told, by autumn 2013 Blackstone had readied to issue the
first SFRBS in a deal backed by Deutsche Bank. The typically
Byzantine structure is laid out in Figure 8.218 Known as the
Invitation Homes 2013SFR 1, the bond was backed by 3,207
single-family rental homes spread across Arizona, California,
Florida, Georgia, and Illinois,219 selected from some 40,000 then
owned by Blackstone.220 While distributed in a number of states,
the underlying assets underlying the bond were highly concen215

WonJu Sul, Single-Family Rental Securitization: Where Are We and Where Will
We Be?, CRE FIN. WORLD, Autumn 2015, at 22, 23. Of course, as the housing market
has moved further out of its historic crash, the reasons for confidence have also congealed into something more like a new reality, albeit one premised on “a housing recovery without a homeowner recovery.” Francesca Mari, A $60 Billion Housing Grab
by Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES (March 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/04/
magazine/wall-street-landlords.html [https://perma.cc/MV85-6NCU]. At least within
the first half-year of the Coronavirus crash, it would appear that even despite
warnings of an impending eviction crisis the gains wrought from the homeownerless
housing recovery have yet remained intact. See Jen Kirby, America’s Looming
Housing Catastrophe, Explained, VOX (July 8, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/
21301823/rent-coronavirus-covid-19-housing-eviction-crisis [https://perma.cc/HGB56RKU]; Why, Despite the Coronavirus Pandemic, House Prices Continue To Rise,
ECONOMIST (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2020/
09/30/why-despite-the-coronavirus-pandemic-house-prices-continue-to-rise [https://
perma.cc/2LHF-373H]. But see Shehryar Qazi, Another Real Estate Crash Is Coming,
JACOBIN (May 16, 2020), https://jacobinmag.com/2020/05/real-estate-crash-pandemiccoronavirus [https://perma.cc/8HLV-ZEGX] (sounding a skeptical alarm about the
intermediate term health of the housing, real estate, and mortgage-related markets
amidst the Coronavirus crisis).
216
All. of Californians for Cmty. Empowerment Inst., Financialization of SingleFamily Rentals: The Rise of Wall Street’s New Rental Empire, KCET: CITY RISING
(Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.kcet.org/shows/city-rising/financialization-of-single-familyrentals-the-rise-of-wall-streets-new-rental [https://perma.cc/N5KY-RW63].
217
Id.
218
Elora Raymond, Are SingleFamily Rental Securitizations Here To Stay?, FED.
RSRV. BANK OF ATLANTA: REAL EST. RSCH. (May 16, 2014), https://www.frbatlanta
.org/blogs/real-estate-research/2014/05/16/are-single-family-rental-securitizations-hereto-stay [https://perma.cc/SA2L-ASLT]; Pierson, supra note 209, at 67 fig.12.
219
Raymond, supra note 218.
220
Pierson, supra note 209, at 59.
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trated. About nine percent of the 3,207, for example, were located
in Phoenix.221 There was also further concentration within locales.
A mapping of the included houses in Phoenix shows that the assets
backing the security were concentrated in low- and middle-income
neighborhoods, with some “hav[ing] at least one, if not two or
three, Blackstone-owned homes on just about every block.”222
The underlying basis of Invitation Homes 2013-SFR 1 in the
3,207 houses Blackstone selected from its larger stock can be
compared to the estimated 14.5 million single-family home rental
units existing across the United States at the outset of 2013, as
compared to 24.5 million apartment rental units.223 Indeed, the
impending success of Blackstone’s Invitation Homes 2013-SFR 1
offering meant that already by the third quarter of 2013
competition for purchasing single-family homes began to heat up,
especially as real estate investment trusts (“REITs”) became
interested.224 While there were no REITs in the business of
purchasing single-family properties in 2011, as the Blackstone
Group’s efforts were beginning to come to fruition, the first REIT
devoted to doing so emerged in the form of the Silver Bay Realty
Trust Corporation, which at the very end of 2012 had an initial
public offering of $300 million with a market capitalization of $709
million.225 By the third quarter of the next year, 2013—just as
Blackstone was issuing the Invitation Homes 2013-SFR 1
product—Silver Bay, along with two other new REITs that were
formed to compete with it, committed to spending over $600 billion
on single-family housing stock.226 By 2014, these three REIT’s

221
Laura Gottesdiener, How Wall Street Has Turned Housing into a Dangerous GetRick-Quick Scheme—Again, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 29, 2013), http://www.motherjones
.com/politics/2013/11/wall-street-buying-foreclosed-homes/ [https://perma.cc/A35RUEYD].
222
Id.
223
Pierson, supra note 209, at 76.
224
REITs are companies authorized to own and operate real estate. James Chen,
Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT), INVESTOPEDIA (June 30, 2020), https://www
.investopedia.com/terms/r/reit.asp [https://perma.cc/3BCT-M7Q5]. First authorized in
the 1960s, their founding purpose was analogous to that of a mutual fund investing
in the stock markets. Id. REITs also invest in other real estate assets. Id. Traditionally
they did so in either properties themselves or mortgages on properties. It was thus
mortgage REITs that characteristically invested in the MBS markets, though there is
no absolute distinction between what activities—real estate unit owning versus
mortgage debt owning—they can devote themselves to.
225
Pierson, supra note 209, at 70. REITs need not be publicly traded in the way
Silver Bay is traded.
226
Id.
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alone had succeeding in acquiring some 33,000 units.227 On average, Silver Bay and the other two REITs are estimated to have
spent five to ten thousand dollars on renovations per home, at a
total cost of approximately seventy million dollars.228 Of course,
very quickly, reports of poor quality renovation, upkeep, and
exploitative landlord practices emerged as well, as they continue
to do alongside various other concerns about profiteering on the
disadvantaged.229
Between the upsurge in REIT activity and the issuance of
additional SFRBS offerings—for example, another by Colony Capital appeared in March 2014230—it was soon apparent that the
market for investing in single-family rentals was a real one. By
May 2014, the San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank estimated
that institutional players had purchased some 90,000 to 150,000
properties, with fifteen to twenty billion dollars.231 Two years
later, by January 2016, the San Francisco Fed reported that the
seven largest institutional investors involved in the single-family
REO business controlled some 170,000 units, concentrated, especially, in the Sun Belt states.232
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Within just four years, some one percent of the country’s fourteen to fifteen million renter-occupied single-family properties had
been absorbed, with the greatest number situated in the Phoenix
area.234 Yet this likely underestimates the true significance.
Other estimates, for example, point out that private equity firms
have brought some untold additional number of homes into their
single-family rental stock by making ongoing purchases through
“proprietary software and algorithms” that “instantly bid on
thousands of homes at auctions across the country,” thus crowding
out ordinary purchasers.235 As various REITs have further gone
public, now subjecting them to the further demands of equity
owners demanding shareholder value, this additional form of
securitization represents a major “paradigm shift for the singlefamily rental market,” as the San Francisco Fed put it.236 Indeed,
by February 2017, Invitation Homes transformed into the
country’s biggest REIT specializing in single-family home purchases, with its industry pioneer parent, the Blackstone Group,
raising “$1.54 billion in an initial public offering” for “77 million
shares [priced] at $20 each.”237
Moreover, after the first initially uncertain two years, SFRBS
assets have now evolved into a hybrid between the earlier residential and commercial MBS, and the largely unregulated market is
now even further blurring the line between rental- and mortgagebacked securities. In addition to so-called multi-borrower deals,
234
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newer SFRBS products are now moving in the direction of pooling
together real estate assets consisting of both the rental payments
from the ever-increasing number of single-family homes that
private equity firms are buying up and mortgage payments from
ordinary owner-occupied homes.238
C. Some Normative Alternatives
One way to assess the normative dimension of the SFRBS
might be from a perspective of the kind that scholars of securities,
banking, and business law have devoted to earlier forms of securitization. However, one will quickly see that the lion’s share of such
attention emerged only after the Great Recession, usually while
looking back on the bursting of the housing bubble as the
precipitating event.239 Given its relative novelty, however, the
securitization of rental payments discussed in Part IV is yet to
lend itself to such retrospective treatment. As a result, the rise of
the SFRBS is more likely to be comprehended in the way the upsurge in MBS products was for much of the 1980s and 1990s. That
is, it is more likely to be viewed through the lens of technical
questions about the structuring of the underlying deals that
SFRBS products are built on.240
Indeed, much as the RMBS was when the market for that
product began to be ramped up in the late 1990s, the SFRBS to
date has been normatively justified in the way securitization more
generally has been: as a means of promoting liquidity241 in the
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housing market, especially given the sharp contraction in mortgage lending after the crisis.242 Such justifications are also, as with
the RMBS before, further burnished by the idea that securitization
is a way of democratizing access to credit and mitigating past
inequities in mortgage lending.243
To close Part IV, therefore, I will make explicit the Article’s
alternative framework for approaching the normative dimension
of the SFRBS specifically and derivative financial asset property
rooted in real estate value more generally. The proposals made
below are, taken on their own terms, quite mild. However, they
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may appear all the more bold and even politically feasible in light
of the reasons discussed in the Introduction there are to think that
we may be ready to leave behind the impulse that characterized
the initial policy response to the Coronavirus shock that found us
largely eschewing structural transformation—much as we did in
the aftermath of the 2007 crisis—for measures that instead
prioritized channeling free or low-cost money to large corporate
and financial actors that have grown accustomed to financial asset
price inflation as a modus operandi.
1.

Shifting Tax Burdens Back onto Real Estate and Capital
Gains

As I noted at the start of Part IV, the key policy question that
the perspective from property-as-rent poses has to do with asking
how socially useful it is to inflate real estate prices in the way our
legal system has encouraged by providing tax breaks for accumulating various kinds of real estate debt. Given constraints of space,
the reader can refer back to that earlier part of the discussion,
which also made explicit the purpose of disaggregating residential
real estate prices in the way I have in Section IV.A. At the most
basic normative level of proposing new policy options, therefore,
the argument presented at the outset of Part IV stands. Taxing
the economic rent of land price inflation—as distinct from real
estate price inflation based on rising costs of capital improvements
and construction—thus merits serious attention. This is especially important given the way tax policy at the local, state, and
national levels has now for decades regressively shifted burdens
off of real estate and asset price gains rooted in real estate—not to
mention financial asset property more generally—and onto
consumption and labor incomes by and of the parts of the
population that have little accumulated wealth to tax in the first
place.244
2.

Mis-accounting for Land Price Gains as Structure Cost
Increases

In addition to elements of our tax law that allow for the
excessive depreciation of buildings, especially in the commercial
real estate context, as noted earlier there is reason to think
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predominant national income accounting practices overestimate
the cost of maintaining and replacing built structures.245 As a
result, the indirect method for inferring land price values by
subtracting the replacement cost of structures from the price
buyers pay for real estate in the market is liable to have an
underestimating tendency. Insofar as the land price component of
real estate values is higher than our existing data suggests,
therefore, modifying our accounting practices would add to the
normative weight of the policy changes discussed in Section
IV.C.1.
3.

Reframing the Justification from Promoting Liquidity

From the overall perspective this Article has elaborated from
Part I to Part IV, how does the default justification of securitization—and financial asset property rooted in real estate value
more generally—fare?246 Is there a way to critically assess the justification of promoting liquidity or democratizing credit without
retrospection affording us the luxury of knowing that securitization has evidently exposed the economy to too much systemic
risk? What does the SFRBS look like if it is instead surveyed from
the standpoint of a conception of property-as-rent that is as authentic to western legal and economic thinking about the right to
property as any other? In this final segment of Section IV.C, I
discuss the normative dimension of securitization in this more
abstract sense.
Of course, one may here feel it appropriate to draw a
seemingly important distinction between the residential MBS and
the SFRBS. This is because when assessed at the level of the home
as a tangible physical shelter, it may appear that the mortgage
payments comprising the revenue streams making the RMBS
possible are fundamentally different from the rental payments
making the SFRBS possible. Indeed, one might even be willing to
reflexively grant a weak form of the case against the argument of
promoting liquidity or democratizing credit in the context of the
245
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SFRBS—say, by deeming it vaguely extractive—in exact proportion to one’s more considered unwillingness to do so in the other,
given the equity building payments that seem to support the
RMBS—this is especially the case insofar as RMBS remain an
important part of the landscape of financial property. Yet there
are a number of problems, both empirical and theoretical, with
going only so far as we would be allowed by a mere weak case
against the normative argument of promoting liquidity or democratizing credit.
First, at the empirical level, given the more than six trillion
dollars in equity capital and wealth that vanished in the wake of
the 2006–2007 crisis, it is evidently not so easy to draw a line
between equity-building payments and extractive landlord payments.247 Second, even without referring to the disappearance of
Main Street’s illusory capital amidst the great unwinding of the
post-2006 era, as Section IV.A shows so vividly, many—and eventually most—mortgage payments must be seen as servicing
scarcity premiums that derive from land rather than directly
building the equity of the ordinary consumer’s portfolio. While
this would not necessarily be too striking to observers in the
eighteenth century, it surely should be to us today, long after the
conception of property-as-rent has largely been lost.
What of the problems at the theoretical level with making only
a weak case against the normative argument from promoting
liquidity or democratizing credit, by making some kind of distinction between the SFRBS and RMBS? Here, the last observation—
about the empirical importance of what Section IV.A demonstrates
about land’s site value—must be understood as also having
evident theoretical implications. Indeed, as much is made clear by
the very conception of property-as-rent. Less obviously, it is also
necessary to consider how more precisely we should understand
the role of housing as an asset that exists under the right to
property. The idea that RMBS bonds are predicated on equitybuilding payments in a way that distinguishes them from SFRBS
payments is thus true only to the extent that one limits one’s
perspective in a very particular way. That is, it is true only to the
extent that housing’s role as property is thought to be fully
determined by asking who owns a house in its capacity as a tangible shelter, together with the direct equity value such ownership
ostensibly permits to that owner. Yet there are clearly other—and
247

Landy, supra note 38, at 2.

436

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:363

relative to the larger anonymous forces of the global economy,
more important—ways that housing is converted into property.
Indeed, coming full circle to where the Article began, every kind
of securitization of underlying housing assets demonstrates that
the homeowner’s “right to exclude” or even “right to exclusively determine use” does not really entail any such thing. In other words,
it is not up to the homeowner whether her house is to be excluded
from being made into debt-based financial asset property belonging to an investment fund. Indeed, such varieties of use determination are made in complete defiance of whatever the owner may
want to the contrary. Instead, various other kinds of use determination will have evidently been taking place simultaneously by the
legal system’s ability to fashion and distribute even the most
seemingly non-bundle-like object as just some additional stick in
some other institutional investor’s own bundle—or, even, as just
some additional stick in some other institutional investor’s own
stick that is, itself, part of still some other institutional investor’s
own bundle, as in the case of the CMO as distinct from the RMBS.
Ultimately, then, even if we all decided to say that a house’s owner
held the real “thing” she owned so unitarily as to effectively embody the caricature of the Blackstonian “sole dominion” holder,
which no theorist today actually endorses, their right to property
would still not consist of any right of exclusive use determination
let alone absolute exclusion of whatever other kind.
Finally, and still at the theoretical level, the weak case against
the argument of promoting liquidity or democratizing credit that normatively underpins the SFRBS, and securitization more generally,
does not go far enough, because we should not be confused by
semantics. In other words, the underlying payment streams that
support the SFRBS are not “rent” because they fail to build equity
in the way that the mortgage payments that underlie the RMBS
propose to be. Nor, indeed, do the mortgage payments that underlie the RMBS capture “rent” only when a crisis induces a collapse
of trillions of dollars in apparent equity. Rather, when considering
the normative argument for financial innovation that is rooted in
the idea of promoting liquidity or democratizing credit, we must
ask whether command over the payments that support both the
SFRBS and RMBS amounts to a form of property-as-rent for at
least three other reasons: (1) because of the possibility that they
service debt that is making claims on future incomes that would
otherwise derive from production and productive investment;
(2) because much of that debt is, itself, built on real estate lending
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as the historically largest source of debt in the economy more
generally; and (3) because of how much of the real estate debt
alluded to under item (2) is, itself, really based on lending against
the scarcity premiums of land rather than produced structures.
CONCLUSION
Through a method that has been, by turns, analytical, historical, and empirical, this Article has sought to contribute to ongoing
debate about the nature of, and the right to, property in law. Its
central argument has been that there is a long-standing conception of property-as-rent that has remained too long neglected,
whether by those who offer object-centered views, focusing on
property’s exclusionary aspect, or those who privilege “propriety,”
and thus property’s social or communitarian rather than economic, preference satisfying, and commoditarian aspect.
In clarifying the roots of the alternative conception of propertyas-rent going back to the work of the leading classical economists,
and really before, this Article has also emphasized the importance
of this conception to the early legal or institutionalist economists
during the Progressive Era in the United States and their inheritors. Being more than just an exercise in legal history, however,
this Article has put this alternative conception into dialogue with
the reality of our post-1970 political economy in order to demonstrate the ongoing importance of legal forms that permit an
identity between land, the right to property, and the control of
economic rent. As this Article has sought to demonstrate empirically, this is because scarcity premiums associated with the land
price component of home price values in the market for residential
real estate remain central to the ongoing proliferation of various
new forms of debt-based financial ownership claims on society’s
productive resources. Using the example of one such new form—
the SFRBS—this Article ultimately uses all three of its perspectives—analytical, historical, and empirical—to make a normative
case against renewing our reliance on exotic varieties of real estate
securitization, which continue to be justified mainly based on the
argument of democratizing credit.
After the Great Recession, in an age when “[s]tretched [a]sset
[p]rices succumbing to [g]ravity” had become a question of when
rather than if well before the Coronavirus shock would again precipitate a crisis of world-historical proportions for American and global
capitalism, it was already hazardous to sit content waiting for the
distance of retrospection to begin saying “we should have known
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better.”248 To continue doing so now—after the intensifed financialization of real estate has subsisted side by side with a mounting crisis
of affordabilty and increased calls to decommodify the provision of
shelter, after not one but two proverbial black swans have appeared in a period of barely ten years, and after the first real signs
in decades of a more fundametnal possible shift being afoot in our
political economic priorities—would simply be inexcusable.249
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